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INTRODUCTION

In this Article we explore the phenomenon of shared international responsibility among multiple actors that contribute to harmful outcomes that
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international law seeks to prevent.' We examine the foundations and manifestations of shared responsibility, explain why international law has had
difficulty in grasping its complexity, and set forth a conceptual framework
that allows us to better understand and study the phenomenon. Such a
framework provides a basis for further development of principles of international law that correspond to the needs of an era characterized by joint and
coordinated, rather than independent, action.
Questions of shared responsibility are critical to many pressing issues in
international law. Consider the following examples. If states do not meet obligations to reduce emissions to prevent climate change, and human
displacement and environmental harm occurs, the question will arise which
states are responsible.2 If states or international organizations, in particular
the United Nations, fail to live up to the collective "responsibility to protect"
(R2P) human populations from mass atrocities 3-a responsibility that rests
in part on obligations that are binding on a plurality of states or organizations4-the question will arise who is responsible for the failure to act.' If
two or more states or international organizations conduct joint military operations in which some soldiers violate international humanitarian law, the
question of how to distribute responsibility among these states, organizations, and individual perpetrators arises. 6 If states agree to cooperate,

1.

For more on the concept of "outcomes," see infra Part I.B.

2.

The question is not entirely hypothetical, as thought has been given to the possibil-

ity of claims that vulnerable states or populations may make against states that would be
responsible for (part of) the problem. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 23-49 (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2011). See generally Michael G.

Faure & Andrd Nollkaemper, InternationalLiability As an Instrument to Prevent and Compensatefor Climate Change, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 123 (2007).
U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the
3.

Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). The United Nations first recognized
the "three pillars" of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A.
Res. 60/1, [ 138-140, U.N. Doc. AIRes/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome].
4.
DIANA AMNius, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT BY MILITARY MEANS-EMERGING
NORMS ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? 502-25 (2008); Monica Hakimi, State Bystander
Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 341, 342-43, 342 n.5 (2010); Arne Johan Vetlesen, Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the Bystander, 37 J. PEACE REs. 519, 529 (2000).

This question has been considered to some extent by the International Court of Jus5.
tice (ICJ). Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, [379 (Feb. 26) (discussing
the state's responsibility for failure to prevent genocide, one of the mass atrocities that R2P
requires states to prevent); see also James Pattison, Assigning HumanitarianIntervention and
the Responsibility to Protect, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE

173 (Julia Hoffman & Andrd Nollkaemper eds., 2012).
6.
This question was raised after the invasion of Iraq by the United States and the
United Kingdom in 2003. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, The Continuing Occupation?Issues of
Joint and Several Liability andEffective Control, in THE IRAQ WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
161 (Phil Shiner & Andrew Williams eds., 2008). A similar question was raised regarding
the distribution of responsibilities in the hybrid U.N. and African Union force in Sudan. See
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whether or not through international institutions, to conserve fish stocks beyond their Exclusive Economic Zone but fail to realize that objective, the
distribution of responsibility among the wrongdoing states will have to be
determined.' If two states under the aegis of the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union (Frontex) contribute to joint missions
to control the external borders of the European Union (EU) and the rights of
asylum seekers are violated, the question will arise which if any of the state
or organizational actors involved are responsible and how that responsibility
should be distributed among them. As a final example, if two or more states
agree to allocate tasks for hosting refugees and one of them does not live up
to its obligations, the question may arise whether only that latter state, or
both states, or perhaps also the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees if it
has been given a role, are responsible. 9
A study of shared responsibility in international law is therefore timely.
As states, international institutions, and other actors increasingly engage in
cooperative action, the likelihood of harm or other outcomes proscribed by
international law multiplies. Injured parties may then be faced with a plurality of wrongdoing actors.
The examples multiply rapidly once we recognize the variety of actors
that can contribute to outcomes that, from the perspective of international
law, are undesirable. In this Article we focus mainly on states and, to a lesser extent, international organizations.'o However, in the above examples of
generally Sarah E. Kreps, The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications
and Prospectsfor Success, AFR. SECURITY REV., no. 4, 2007 at 65.

7.

See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish

Stocks, N.Y.C., N.Y, July 24-Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish

Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/37 (Sept. 8, 1995).
8.
See Maarten den Heijer, Europe Beyond Its Borders: Refugee and Human Rights
Protection in Extraterritorial Immigration Control, in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION
CONTROL

169, 191-92 (Bernard Ryan & Valsamis Mitsilegas eds., 2010); Efthymios Papas-

tavridis, "FortressEurope" and FRONTEX: Within or Without InternationalLaw?, 79
J. INT'L L. 75, 107 (2010).

NORDIC

9.
See Council Regulation 343/2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for
Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in
One of the Member States by a Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50/1) 1 (EU); AGNts G.
HURWITZ, THE COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES TO PROTECT REFUGEES 89-126
(2009); Marjoleine Zieck, Doomed to Failfrom the Outset? UNHCR's Convention Plus Initiative Revisited, 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 387, 397 (2009).

10.
We acknowledge that the multilayered nature of international organizations may
pose additional challenges for the law of international responsibility to which the general rules
of state responsibility are not mutatis mutandis applicable. See generally Christiane Ahlborn,
The Rules of International Organizationsand the Law of InternationalResponsibility (Am-

sterdam Ctr. for Int'l Law, SHARES Research Paper No. 2011-03, 2011), available at
http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/SHARES-RP-02-final.pdf
(discussing the multilayered nature of international organizations and the additional challenges they
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climate change and atrocities committed during armed conflicts, the role of
nonstate actors is critical. These situations often bring into play the question
of individual or other private-actor responsibility, an issue integral to a clear
understanding of shared responsibility even though it may sometimes fly below the radar of international law.
The apparent increase of situations of shared responsibility raises fundamental questions for positive law and legal doctrine. The principles of
international law on the basis of which responsibility among multiple actors
is currently allocated are, in the words of Brownlie, "indistinct"" and do not
provide clear guidance. There is still much truth to Noyes and Smith's 1988
observation that "[t]he law of multiple state responsibility is undeveloped.
The scholarly literature is surprisingly devoid of reference to the circumstances or consequences of multiple state responsibility. Judicial or arbitral
decisions addressing a state's assertions that other states share responsibility
are essentially unknown."' 2 While the latter statement is not entirely correct
in light of recent judicial developments, 3 it remains true that as a result of
jurisdictional limitations and underdeveloped principles of shared responsibility, the contribution of the case law is limited. In legal scholarship, we
find useful contributions that may help us identify the conceptual tools and
perspectives for reaching satisfactory solutions in situations where two or
more states or other actors are collectively involved in an act or omission
causing injury to third parties. However, a comprehensive conceptual
framework within which to better understand the phenomenon of shared responsibility still requires formulation.
As the variety and frequency of cooperative endeavors between states
and other actors increase, there is a need for new perspectives that allow us
to understand how the international legal order could and does address
shared responsibility. Such new perspectives might eventually help relevant
actors to develop international principles and processes that are suited to address such situations. Improving the law applicable to shared responsibility
may serve the interests of injured parties, who may otherwise experience
difficulty in identifying the responsible entities and the scope of their responsibility, as well as the interests of states more generally by providing
some predictability as to how their own responsibility might be engaged.
In attempting to formulate such new perspectives, we must cover a vast
terrain, including the design, content, and role of primary rules that define
the respective obligations of states and other actors in cases of collective
pose for the law of international responsibility because of the fact that the general rules of
state responsibility are not mutatismutandis applicable).
11.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 457 (7th ed. 2008);
see also Roger P. Alford, Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law Violations, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 233 (2011) (describing the lack of clarity under
international law for apportioning responsibility in the context of tort law).
12.
John E. Noyes & Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint
and Several Liability, 13 YALE J.INT'L L. 225, 225 (1988).
13.
See infra Part V.C.1.
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action. We also must address the content and implementation of secondary
obligations: how can principles of responsibility for wrongdoing themselves
address shared responsibility? We furthermore cannot neglect international
courts and tribunals, where claims of shared responsibility may eventually
arise but where the procedural law, at least in some cases, is ill suited to deal
with claims that transcend a bilateralist framework. We moreover must consider the wide variety of practices by which actors can be held accountable
for their involvement in collective wrongdoing but which cannot be qualified in terms of formal international responsibility and which will not be
treated as such by international courts. Examples include supervisory institutional arrangements set up under multilateral environmental agreements.
Effectively addressing issues of shared responsibility requires that these
problems be considered in relation to one another, rather than in isolation.
And finally, each of these dimensions of shared responsibility raises fundamental normative questions regarding the criteria that should govern the
apportionment of responsibility among multiple actors. Such criteria might
include justice, equity, effectiveness, and power; for instance, it may be argued that those actors best placed to remedy a wrong effectively should
incur more responsibility than others. Indeed, the current regime and its dynamics, potential, and limitations cannot be understood without considering
the particular normative interests it serves.
In this Article, we identify the principles of international law that are
applicable to cases of shared responsibility as well as gaps in the international legal framework and provide the building blocks for a new
perspective that may be better able to grasp the legal complexities arising
out of such situations. Our main argument is as follows: Current international law is largely based on the notion of independent international
responsibility (mainly of states and international organizations). This notion
does not always provide the conceptual or normative tools for allocating responsibility between a plurality of actors in situations where contributions to
harmful outcomes cannot be attributed based on individual causation of each
actor. Such tools cannot properly be developed unless we abandon the fiction that international responsibility is a unitary system in which a limited
set of principles can address all questions of shared responsibility, irrespective of the nature of the actors, the interests at issue, and the nature of the
conduct in question. In short, we advance a model for a more differentiated
approach to international responsibility that can better address questions of
shared responsibility.
Our methodology is dialectical, adopting both a holistic and pluralist
approach to international responsibility. It is holistic in the sense that we
suggest that we need not necessarily abide by the dichotomy between primary and secondary rules that often structures debates on international
responsibility. Analyses of situations of shared responsibility must take into account both the content and nature of an obligation and the principles
of responsibility that apply to its violation. However, we also adopt a pluralist approach, as we argue that in particular cases one needs to
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distinguish between public and private dimensions of international responsibility and that differentiated approaches better reflect the varied nature of
obligations and the diversity of objectives of international responsibility.
We first identify and define the core concepts that allow us to assess the
law pertaining to shared responsibility and to conceptualize the relevant
practice (Part I). We then identify the fundamental changes in the
international legal order that explain the emergence of situations of shared
responsibility and that need to be taken into account in framing the relevant
legal principles and procedures (Part II). Subsequently, we discuss the
potentials and limits of the current framework of international responsibility
in dealing with situations of shared responsibility (Part III). Part IV then
contextualizes the need to develop principles of shared responsibility by
revisiting the foundations of the law of state responsibility and to construe
them in a manner that is better adapted to the needs of addressing shared
responsibility. Part V discusses the principles and processes of shared
responsibility in light of these reconstructed foundations.
I. A SEMANTIC TOOLBOX OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

The examples given in the Introduction illustrate that questions of
shared responsibility may arise in a wide variety of scenarios and involve a
number of different modalities. In literature and practice we do not find a
consistent or well-established use of concepts and terms to capture that variety. Indeed, the term shared responsibilitythat we explore in this Article has
hardly been used in legal literature at all. It is therefore necessary to provide
a preliminary typology that transcends the diversity of possible situations
and allows us to identify the possible situations of shared responsibility. In
this Part we therefore propose a semantic toolbox of terms and concepts that
form a common point of reference for constructive dialogue on questions of
shared responsibility.
A. Responsibility

We use the term responsibility to refer to ex post facto responsibility for
contributions to injury. Our main interest is in situations where collaboration
between two or more actors leads to harmful outcomes, for instance by infringing the rights of third parties, and in the related question of how to
apportion responsibility among these actors.
The term "responsibility" has frequently been used to refer to obligations that ex ante structure the conduct of the relevant actors. Examples
include Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which refers to the
responsibility of all states to prevent transboundary environmental harm,14
14.

U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,

Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, ch. 1, princ. 21,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 26, 1972). The General Assembly subsequently embraced the Stockholm Declaration's principal tenets in G.A. Res. 2994 (XXVII), U.N. Doc.
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and the use of the term responsibility in the phrase "responsibility to protect."15 It also appears that the Obama administration has used the term
"shared responsibility" primarily in this ex ante sense.16 Ex ante and ex post
shared responsibility can be closely related. When two or more actors have a
shared responsibility in the former sense and do not do what is required,
shared responsibility in the latter sense may follow. For example, when all
riparian states to an international watercourse have a shared responsibility
(in the sense of an obligation resting on each of them) to protect the ecosystem of the watercourse, and they all engage in acts that destroy the
ecosystem, they may all be responsible for the consequences. However, for
semantic clarity and to prevent confusion as to the focus of this Article, we
will resist as much as possible using the word "responsibility" to describe ex
ante obligations.
With the term responsibility we thus refer to international responsibility
for wrongful acts in the meaning of the Articles on State Responsibility
(ASR)"7 and the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO), both developed by the International Law Commision (ILC).'8
B. SharedResponsibility

We define the term shared responsibility (as distinct from responsibility
as such) by four main features. First, the concept of shared responsibility refers to the responsibility of multiple actors. These actors obviously include
states and international organizations, but may also include other actors such
as multinational corporations and individuals.
A/RES/2994 (Dec. 15, 1972). For background information and a discussion of the Stockholm
Declaration, see Dinah Shelton, Stockholm Declaration(1972) and Rio Declaration(1992), in
IX THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 602 (Rudiger

Wolfrum ed., 2012).
15.
Concerning the semantics of the term "responsibility to protect" (formed by a
bundle of primary obligations), see Sandra Szurek, Responsabilitd de Pmtdger: Nature de
l'Obligationet ResponsabiliteInternationale, in SocIlT9 FRAN AISE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, COLLOQUE DE NANTERRE: LA RESPONSABILITt DE PROT9GER 91, 100 (2008); see
also Sigrun I. Skogly, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, 29 OXFORD J. INT'L L. 827,
836 (2009) (arguing that the notion of shared responsibility should consist of both a preventative and a reactive dimension).

16.

See, e.g., Barack Obama, Remarks on United States Military and Diplomatic Strat-

egies for Afghanistan and Pakistan (Mar. 27, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov:80/
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900196/pdflDCPD-200900196.pdf ("Security demands a new sense of
shared responsibility.").
17.
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, in Report
of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly on Its Fifty-Third Session, 56

U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 1,43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ASR], reprintedin
[2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.l (Part 2). The Commentary to the ASR stipulates that "[t]he term 'international responsibility' covers the new
legal relations which arise under international law by reason of the internationally wrongful
act of a State." Id. 177, art. 1, cmt. 1.
18.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibility of International Organizations, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.778 (May 30, 2011) [hereinafter ARIO].
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Second, the term refers to the responsibility of multiple actors for their
contribution to a single harmful outcome. Such an outcome may take a variety of forms, including material or nonmaterial damage to third parties. As
we will further explain below, on this point we distance ourselves 19from the
concept used by the JLC, which opted for a more narrow approach.
The choice of the term harmfful outcome as a defining element of shared
responsibility finds support in the notion of outcome as a basis for responsibility in legal theory. 20 Different conceptualizations of shared responsibility
may be considered, for instance, by defining it in terms of a contribution to a
single injury. 2' However, this would force us to expand beyond the commonly considered notion of injury as a constitutive element of a particular
wrongful act vis-A-vis particular parties. That is, in international law the
concept of injury is typically used as an element of a particular wrongful
act: state A acts wrongfully toward state B if it causes injury, whether legal
or material, to that latter state. This usage is not easily combined with a concept of injury that captures acts by multiple actors contributing to outcomes
that affect many states or the international community as a whole-that
22
would encompass public-order dimensions of international responsibility.
As to the use of "harm" in our concept of outcomes: while it is true that re23
sponsibility can arise irrespective of physical harm caused, we suggest a
broad use of the term "harm," encompassing all situations in which actors
violate their obligations toward others. We thus opt for a definition referring
to a contribution to harmful outcomes that the law seeks to prevent, irrespective of the question whether such an outcome causes injury to a particular
actor. This will allow us, later in this Article, to conceptualize shared responsibility in both its private law and public law dimensions.
Third, the term shared responsibility strictu sensu refers to situations
where the contributions of each individual cannot be attributed to them
based on causation. If individual causal contributions could be determined,
the allocation of responsibility could fully be based on principles of individual responsibility, rather than shared responsibility. In this sense, shared
responsibility is an antidote for situations where causation does not provide
19.
20.

See ARIO, supra note 18, art. 48; ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 47.
See, e.g., TONY HONOR9, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 27 (1999) (defining outcome

responsibility in terms of responsibility for the good and bad outcomes of a person's conduct);
David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, II CRITICAL REV. INT'L Soc. &
POL. PHIL. 383, 384-85 (2008). But see Peter Cane, Responsibility and Fault: A Relational
and FunctionalApproach to Responsibility, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY 88, 88-110 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001). For the concept of harm, see, for example, Joel
Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 683-88 (1968) (defining responsibility in
terms of contribution to harm).
Brigitte Stem, A Plea for "Reconstruction" of InternationalResponsibility Based
21.
on the Notion of Legal Injury, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY
OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 93, 93 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005).
See, e.g., ASR, supra note 17, 77, art. 31, cmt. 5.
22.
23.

See id.; see also id. 77, art. 31, cmt. 6.
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an adequate basis for responsibility.2 4 It is precisely for such situations that
existing international law has not always offered sufficient solutions.
The fourth defining feature of shared responsibility in this broad sense
is that the responsibility of two or more actors for their contribution to a particular outcome is distributed to them separately, rather than resting on them
collectively.25 If the responsibility rested on a collectivity, it would no longer
be shared, but rather would be the responsibility of the collectivity as such. 26
For instance, the responsibility of the EU for its Frontex policies is not a
shared responsibility, while the responsibility of the EU member states that
are involved in a Frontex action, possibly in combination with the responsibility of Frontex itself, is shared.
However, shared responsibility does not only consist of the aggregation
of two or more individual responsibilities. In most of the examples given in
the introduction to this Article, the relevant actors stood in some relationship
to each other, for instance because they agreed to cooperate to pursue particular aims. Indeed, perhaps the most relevant application of the concept is
to situations where responsibility is based on multiple actors contributing to
each other's acts and thereby to the eventual outcome.27 This notion of
shared responsibility bears some similarity to what others have referred to as
"complex responsibility," but that term fails to capture the element of sharing that is fundamental to our inquiry.28
To refer to situations of shared responsibility, we also use the term joint
responsibility. We emphasize that, at this stage, the term "joint" is meant to
be descriptive and should not be seen as entailing specific legal consequences in terms of substance or procedure, as would the expression "joint and
several responsibility," as discussed in Part V.A.
C. Cooperativeand Cumulative SharedResponsibility

Instances of shared responsibility can be divided into two groups. Our
main interest is in shared responsibility that arises out of joint or concerted
action. We refer to such instances of shared responsibility as cooperative responsibility. This covers such examples as coalition warfare, joint border
patrols, or one state aiding another in committing a wrongful act.
Occurrences of shared responsibility also can arise when there is no
concerted action. For these cases, we adopt the phrase cumulative responsibility. In such cases, we recognize the need for the injured party or parties to
be able to make claims against several entities, despite the fact that these entities acted independently from each other. Examples of such scenarios
24.
On shared responsibility as a concept applying in situations where causation alone
is insufficient, see LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 37-38 (1996).
25.

Id. at 112.

26.

Id. at 106-07 (distinguishing between collective and shared responsibility).

27.
28.

See id. at 36-38.
See ANDREw LINKLATER,

CAL INVESTIGATIONS 101

(2011).

THE PROBLEM OF HARM IN WORLD POLITICS: THEORETI-
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include pollution of an international watercourse caused by two or more riparian states and climate change caused by emissions from several states
that contravene obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 29
The distinction between these two categories may be legally relevant, as
consent to a collective action and its possible consequences will be absent in
situations of cumulative responsibility. This may lead to distinct rules re30
garding the attribution of responsibility.
D. SharedAccountability

Finally, we use the phrase shared accountability to cover situations in
which a multiplicity of actors is held to account for conduct in contravention
of international norms, but where this does not necessarily involve international responsibility for internationally wrongful acts in its formal meaning.
The term "shared accountability" would apply, for instance, to actors that,
even though they may be subject to international obligations, do not incur
international responsibility under current international law. For example, rebel groups are bound by international humanitarian law, yet international
law seems to lack a conception of international responsibility of such groups
for internationally wrongful acts. The term "shared accountability" also may
be used to cover situations where the responsibility of particular actors is
raised in fora that are not empowered to make determinations of international responsibility. Thus, it would allow us to address such complementary but
distinct aspects of a situation as states' legal responsibility and criminal and
civil liability of individuals and other nonstate actors involved, before both
national and international tribunals. It also would allow us to include situations where quasi-judicial or political procedures might be used as the
preferred process for supervising compliance by the actors involved in joint
action, for instance under multilateral environmental agreements. 3 ' This is
particularly relevant for international organizations because of the near impossibility of finding a judicial institution to litigate claims against them.
The term is also applicable to the responsibility of international organiza32
tions under their internal rules.
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
29.
Change art. 2(2), Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
For the difference between the two types of actions, see Noyes & Smith, supra note
30.
12, at 228-31.
See Tullio Treves, Introduction to NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND MECHA31.
NISMS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 1, 2-3
(Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2009); Attila Tanzi & Cesare Pitea, Lessons Learned and the Way
Forward,in NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, supra, at 569, 573-74, 578.
Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAW &
32.
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 43; Pierre Klein, Panels, mddiateurs et
micanismes informels de contr6le des activitis des organisationsinternationales:entre accountability et responsibility, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 217, 219 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012).
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In this Article we will leave the concept of shared accountability largely
aside and confine ourselves to international responsibility proper.
II.

UNDERLYING DYNAMICS

The increase in situations of shared responsibility can be explained in
light of the evolution that international society and the international legal
order have undergone in recent decades. We identify four fundamental
trends that contextualize the phenomenon of shared responsibility: interdependence, moralization, heterogeneity, and permeability. These trends
influence each other in an intertwined way. This interaction should be kept
in mind; their chronological presentation in the following Sections is somewhat artificial because they are often just different ways of describing the
same phenomena, and, more specifically, they are each causes and consequences of each other. Together they help to explain the need for the
international legal system to address shared responsibility.
A. Interdependence

The first trend that is relevant to shared responsibility is that of interdependence underlying international society's passage from a system of
coexistence to one of cooperation.33 It is a truism that states have become
increasingly dependent on each other and in turn have felt compelled to
work collectively to protect common goods.3 4 The underlying reasons for
this trend stem from both changes in facts and changes in perception. As to
the former, in certain areas we can identify factual effects across borders.
For example, the international economy is more and more integrated, with
once primarily domestic crises now having an immediate global impact. In
other areas, it is merely perception that has changed rather than reality. For
example, over the last century an international consensus has emerged that
genocide now is a universal harm requiring international intervention.3 6 The
cooperative response to situations of interdependence can be motivated by
different objectives, such as efficiency in the case of multilateral trade

33.

See W. Friedmann, General Course in Public International Law, in 127 COL-

LECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 93, 110 (1969);

Georges Abi-Saab, Whither the International Community?, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 248, 256
(1998); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, InternationalLaw: Torn Between Coexistence, Cooperationand
Globalization: GeneralConclusions, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 278, 282-83, 285-86 (1998).
34.
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, InternationalEconomic Law, "Public Reason," and
Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, 14 J. INT'L EcON. L. 23, 29 (2011).
35.
See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis, J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 49 (describing the impact of the 2007-08

financial crisis on the global economy).
36.
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 3, I[ 138-139; Hakimi, supra note 4,
at 342-44, 342 n.5; Vetlesen, supra note 4, at 529.

Winter 2013]

Shared Responsibility in InternationalLaw

371

agreements,3 7 but also frequently by the desire for the legitimacy gained by
collective endeavors. A state acting on its own is more vulnerable to criticism that it is acting in its own interests.3 8
Interdependence, whether perceived or real, may lead to the occurrence
of situations implicating shared responsibility. First, the increase in mutual
transborder effects in areas such as financial markets, the environment, or
organized crime3 is bound to result in an increase in situations where such
effects originate in cooperative or cumulative actions by states. There are
simply more opportunities for collectively caused harm. 40
Second, interdependence drives cooperation, often through international
institutions such as the G-20 4 1 or multilateral environmental institutions. 4 2
This informs the corresponding shift in international discourse toward
"global governance," thus creating an increase in situations where responsibility between such institutions and between the participating states must be
sorted out if cooperation leads to harmful outcomes. 43 Indeed, the cooperative, collective context is prone to producing a diffusion of responsibility for
which proper rules on shared responsibility can be an antidote.'
Third, increased interdependence (and more generally globalization)
may also enhance the degree to which states and other actors feel related to

See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2009: TRADE POL37.
ICY COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCY MEASURES 21 (2009), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/res-e/booksp e/anrep-e/worldjtrade report09_e.pdf.
See Pierre Buhler, Military Intervention and Sources of Legitimacy, in JUSTIFYING
38.
WAR? FROM HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO COUNTERTERRORISM 167, 175-76 (Gilles Andriani & Pierre Hassner eds., 2008); Nicholas Tsagourias, Cosmopolitan Legitimacy and UN
Collective Security, in COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 129, 139-40 (Roland Pierik & Wouter Werner eds., 2010).
On financial markets, see, for example, Mishkin, supra note 35, at 68. On transna39.
tional environmental harm, see, for example, Michael Mason, The Governance of
TransnationalEnvironmental Harm: Addressing New Modes of Accountability/Responsibility,
8 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2008, at 8. On transnational crime, see, for example, Felia Allum & Stan Gilmour, Introduction to ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME 1, 1-2 (Felia Allum & Stan Gilmour eds., 2012).
See LINKLATER, supra note 28, at 1-2; MAY, supra note 24, at 4.
40.
See G-20, THE GROUP OF TWENTY: A HISTORY 5 (2008), available at
41.
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/docs/g20history.pdf; see also G-20 Toronto Summit, Toronto,
Can., June 26-27, 2010, G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, pmbl., available at
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g2Odeclaration-en.pdf (noting that the G-20 is "the premier forum for our international economic cooperation").
Robert 0. Keohane et al., Introduction to INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES
42.
oF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 3, 4-5, 7-8 (Peter M. Haas et
al. eds., 4th ed. 2001).
Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance In43.
stitutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 405, 437 (2006). See generally Carol Harlow,
Accountability As a Value in Global Governance and for Global Administrative Law, in VALUES IN GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 173 (Gordon Anthony et al. eds., 2011).
LINKLATER, supra note 28, at 57, 225; MAY, supra note 24, at 38, 73.
44.
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events in other states and thus feel compelled to act. 45 For instance, the notion of R2P may, because of its collective nature, result in shared

responsibility.4 6

B. Moralization

Moving away from the realist view of international relations in which
states seek the protection of their own interests, a combination of actors (including some [notably European] states, international organizations, NGOs,
and scholars) have hypothesized that the international legal order is shifting
in the direction of an increased "moralization." We use the word "moralization" here in the most neutral way possible, as a description of the change in
the discourse and telos of international law, rather than as an evaluation of
the desirability of this trend.
In a nutshell, this trend, the subject of vast commentary, 47 entails a fundamental paradigm shift away from state sovereignty as the cornerstone of
the legal order. It hypothesizes a paradigm based on rights of the individual, 4 8 on the one hand, and the values and interests of the international
community. 49
While this trend of moralization is far from being universally
accepted,50 it has had an undeniable impact on international law. It underlies
the recognition of a hierarchy of norms, such that certain norms carry more
importance for the international community as a whole and thus that the

45.
LINKLATER, supra note 28, at 151, 254.
46.
See, e.g., Pattison, supra note 5.
47.
See, e.g., ANT6NIo AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR HuMANKIND: TOWARDS A NEW Jus GENTIUM 177-79 (2010); Anne Peters, Humanity As the A
and Dl of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513; Sienho Yee, Towards a HarmoniousWorld: The

Roles of the InternationalLaw of Co-progressivenessand Leader States, 7 CHINESE J. INT'L
L. 99, 102 (2008) (coining the term "co-progressiveness," defined as "a society that is all encompassing (hence 'co'), preoccupied with advancements in moral and ethical terms more
than in other respects and having human flourishing as its ultimate goal (hence 'progressiveness')").
48.
And, by extension, "peoples." See Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403,
553-60 (July 22, 2010) (separate opinion of Judge Trindade). In view of the centrality of
the human person in this trend, other authors have referred to this trend as the "humanisation" of international law. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Peters, supra note 47, at 514.
49.
For an overview of the historical evolution toward the taking into account of community interests in the law of state responsibility, see Georg Nolte, From Dionisio Anzilotti to

Roberto Ago: The Classical InternationalLaw of State Responsibility and the Traditional
Primacy of a Bilateral Conception of Inter-state Relations, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1083 (2002).
See generally SANTIAGO VILLALPANDO, L'EMERGENCE DE LA COMMUNAUT
NALE DANS LA RESPONSABILITt DES ETATS (2005).

INTERNATIO-

50.
See, e.g., Jean d'Aspremont, The Foundationsof the InternationalLegal Order, 18
FIN. YB. INT'L L. 219 (2007); Onuma Yusuaki, In Quest of IntercivilizationalHuman Rights:
"Universal" vs. "Relative," 1 ASIA-PAC. J. ON HUM. RTs. & L. 53 (2000).
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violation of those norms might entail different principles of responsibility."
Moralization has also affected the content and development of international
norms through the operation of particular rules of interpretation5 2 and the
process of identifying the substance of international customary law, leading
to a more flexible method of determining customary rules that are thought to
promote a universal good.13 More generally, this moralization underlies the
public-order dimension of international law, which coexists with and to a
limited extent replaces the traditional horizontal interstate model.5 4
The trend of moralization is a relevant contextual element for understanding the phenomenon of shared responsibility. Situations of shared
responsibility often arise in areas that carry heavy moral undertones (such as
R2P, protection of civilians during armed conflict, and so forth). Indeed,
there is a direct connection in most discourse between the moral arguments
underlying an ex ante "shared responsibility" to take action to achieve certain interests and the legal questions that surround a more narrowly (legally)
defined ex post facto "shared responsibility" stemming from such situations.55 The former justifies the extensive development of the latter so as to
better reflect the moral rationales underlying shared responsibility.
A separate dimension of moralization that is relevant to the phenomenon
of shared responsibility is the increased value attached to accountability as
such. We have seen the emergence of a culture of accountability at the
international level. 56 Both in practice and in legal scholarship, great weight is
now attached to the intrinsic value of holding states and individuals

51.
See, e.g., Pierre Klein, Responsibilityfor Serious Breachesof Obligations Deriving
from Peremptory Norms of InternationalLaw and United Nations Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L.
1241 (2002); Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
425 (1999); Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparationsin the Articles on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 833, 841 (2002); Eric Wyler, From "State Crime" to Responsibility
for "Serious Breaches of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International
Law," 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1147 (2002).

See Dov Jacobs, Positivism and International Criminal Law: The Principle of
52.
Legality As a Rule of Conflict of Theories, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POSITIVISM IN A PosTMODERN WORLD 17-19 (Jean d'Aspremont & Jorg Kammerhofer eds., forthcoming 2013),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2046311 (arguing that through methods of interpretation, judges at international criminal tribunals have imported moral considerations in the
determination of customary international law).
For an example in international criminal law, see Noora J. Arajirvi, The Lines
53.
Begin to Blur? Opinio Juris and the Moralisation of Customary International Law (Mar.
2011), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1823288.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
54.
55.
See MAY, supra note 24, at 34-35.
56.

See generally MARK

BOVENS, THE QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY

(1998); Harlow, supra note 43; Paul G. Lauren, From Impunity to Accountability: Forces of Transformation and the Changing
InternationalHuman Rights Context, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL AcAND CITIZENSHIP IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS

COUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES

Malcontent eds., 2004).

15 (Ramesh Thakur & Peter
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accountable for their conduct or their inaction.57 This development, which is
part of a more general trend toward good governance and transparency,58
may contribute to an increase in the number of situations where questions of
shared responsibility will be raised.
C. Heterogeneity

The multiplication of actors that participate in international society is a
third trend that has a direct bearing on questions of shared responsibility. 59
This is most immediately obvious for international organizations. The fact
that states now regularly defer to international organizations the authority to
adopt rules on a wide array of topics-from cultural heritage to health and
environmental law 6 -is likely to lead to questions of shared responsibility
among multiple organizations and between organizations and member
states. The layered nature of international organizations, which are legal
persons but at the same time consist of sovereign states, facilitates the construction of responsibility for wrongdoing as a shared responsibility
between the organization and its member states.61 The 2011 ARIO indeed
envisage that an organization can be responsible in connection with the
wrongful acts of states, including the possibility that an organization may be
responsible for adopting decisions that require states to commit acts that
contravene international obligations. 62 Significantly, the Articles
acknowledge that in such situations both the organization and the state can
be responsible, resulting in a situation of shared responsibility. 63

57.
For example, the Peace Palace Library has 123 books with the word accountability
in the title, forty of which were published in the last three years. Similarly, out of 784 book
chapters or articles listed in the Peace Palace Library with the word accountability in the title,
a full third were published since 2009.
58.
See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? (Christopher Hood
& David Heald eds., 2006) (particularly Chapter 3, entitled "Transparency as a Human
Right"); Padideh Ala'i, From the Peripheryto the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence
on Transparency and Good Governance, 11 J. INT'L EcON. L. 779, 780-81 (2008); Yasmin
Naqvi, The Righ to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?, 88 INT'L REV. RED

CROss 245 (2006).
59.
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 39-55 (2nd prtg. 1995).
60.
The World Trade Organization illustrates this trend by providing a formal negotiation forum for international trade, thus centralizing discussions on this issue within one
institution. See Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 914 (2004) ("[Tlhe procedure by which in-

ternational law is generated increasingly attenuates the link between state consent and the
existence of an obligation under international law.").

61.
See generally CATHERINE BROLMANN, THE INSTITUTIONAL VEIL IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE LAW OF TREATIES (2007)
(describing the layered nature of international organizations).
62.
63.

ARIO, supra note 18, art. 17.
Id. art. 19.
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Also, the increased role of private actors in international relations
engenders additional questions of shared responsibility. The practice of
states delegating power to private entities (the use of private military
contractors, for example) raises questions as to the corresponding
distribution of responsibility for damages caused." A comparable example
is international institutions' reliance on public-private partnerships.65 While
the orthodox position is that, as a matter of international law, only the
delegating state (or organization) can be held responsible for harm resulting
from the act of the private entity, 66 there is an increasing push to consider
the role and coresponsibility of the private entity itself. Illustrative of this
point are the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
which envisage a distribution of responsibilities among states and businesses
that operate in delicate human rights situations or in conflict areas. 67
Apart from delegation by states or international institutions, some private entities exercise powers-directly or through their influence on
states-that cannot be ignored in assessing shared responsibilities. This is
for instance true in relation to the world economy, where corporations
wield influence equal to-and sometimes greater than-some states. 68 The
recent financial crisis in the EU-tied to the intricate relationship between
national policies, European policies, and the influence of private actors
(such as rating agencies)-provides a good illustration.69 Even when private
64.
Nigel D. White & Sorcha MacLeod, EU Operationsand Private Military Contractors: Issues of Corporate and InstitutionalResponsibility, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 965 (2008).

These include, for example, partnerships dealing with Roll Back Malaria, Safe In65.
jection Global Network, and Stop TB (all of which have secretariats in the World Health
Organization) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, which has its secretariat at the U.N. Children's Fund. See Public-PrivatePartnershipsfor Health, WORLD HEALTH

ORG., http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story077/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
On questions of responsibility that may arise in this context, see Lisa Clarke, Responsibility of
International Organizations Under InternationalLaw for the Acts of Global Health PublicPrivate Partnerships,12 CHI..1. INT'L L. 55 (2011).

ASR, supra note 17, 176, arts. 2, 5.
66.
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
67.
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Rep. of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-Generalon the Issue of Human Rights and TransnationalCorporationsand
Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect,Respect, and Remedy" Framework, Human Rights Council,

U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Ruggie Report]. These
guiding principles, in addition to recalling the current obligations of states and businesses under positive law not to contribute to human rights violations, suggest a series of more flexible
due-diligence obligations that can help anticipate any future violations. Id.
See, e.g., Nathan Fage & Louis T. Wells, Jr., Bargaining Power of Multinationals
68.
and Host Governments, 13 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 9 (1982); Carlos M. Vdzquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligationsof CorporationsUnder InternationalLaw, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927,

948 (2005) ("[S]ome multinationals have become powerful enough to exert significant pressure on many governments.").
See, e.g., Jonathon Katz et al., Credit Rating Agencies: No Easy Regulatory Solu69.
tions, CRISIS RESPONSE (The World Bank Group, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2009, available at

http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/CrisisResponse/Note8.pdf

(stating that in the United

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

376

[Vol. 34:359

actors generally may not be responsible as a matter of international law, as a
factual matter they may contribute to harmful outcomes, raising the question
of whether and how that influence should be relevant as a matter of international law.
Where private parties hold subjective rights under international law, 7 0
the number of legal relationships governed by international law, potentially
leading to situations of (shared) responsibility, increases proportionally.' As
a result, the strengthened role of the individual in the international legal order has contributed to the increased number of cases involving questions of
shared responsibility. As individuals have gained access to international and
national institutions, the frequency of instances in which those institutions
are able to confront questions of shared responsibility has increased. International investment arbitration72 and human rights bodies are examples of
this trend.73 The cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
relating to extraterritorial migration policy and violations of international
humanitarian law during joint military operations illustrate the relevance of
shared responsibility. 74
States and Europe, faulty credit ratings and flawed ratings processes are widely perceived as
being among the key contributors to the global financial crisis); see also Proposalfor a Regulation of the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies, COM (2008)

704 final (Nov. 12, 2008).
70.
Anne Peters, The Subjective InternationalRight, 59 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN
RECHTS DER GEGENWART 411 (2011) (Ger.), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.

cfm?abstract id=1825970.
71.
For the longstanding debate on individuals as subjects of international law, see PETER PAVEL REMEC, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAw ACCORDING

To GROTIUS AND VATTEL 13 (1960); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Position of the Individual
in InternationalLaw, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 241, 241 (2001).
72.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]; LucY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 24 (2d ed. 2010).
73.
Anne F. Bayefsky, DirectPetition in the UN Human Rights Treaty System, 95 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 71 (2001); Pietro Sardaro, The Right of Individual Petition to the European Court, in PROTOCOL No. 14 AND THE REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS 45, 45 (Paul Lemmens & Wouter Vandenhole eds., 2005). Individual petition systems
have been created under the following treaties: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 763; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5, June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. OAUILEG/EXP/
AFCHPR/PROT (III); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 22, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; American Convention on
Human Rights: "Pact of San Josd, Costa Rica" art. 44, Nov. 22, 1968, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 25, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by Protocol No. 11 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the
Control Machinery Established Thereby, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155).
74.

See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. See generally MARKO MILANOVIC,

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAw, PRINCIPLES, AND POLI-

cY (2011).
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Likewise, the possibility of individuals being bound by international
obligations and subject to individual responsibility as a matter of
international (rather than national) law leads to more questions about shared
responsibility, and more particularly of what we call shared accountability."
Individuals can cause part of a harmful outcome to which states or other
actors also contribute, and their responsibility can be understood as part of a
larger picture. This relationship of responsibility by states, institutions, and
private individuals for harm is exemplified in the case of the conflict in
Bosnia. In apportioning responsibility, various international and national
judicial and nonjudicial bodies have sought to hold such varied actors as
Serbia, the Netherlands, the United Nations, and Ratko Mladic (among
others) responsible for genocide and war crimes committed during the war.76
D. Permeability

A fourth trend, which explains the emergence of shared responsibility
and will help shape its principles and procedures, is the permeability of the
international and national legal orders. 7
For one, the modem shift toward treating individuals (rather than just
states) as subjects of international law and the corresponding increase in individual access to international institutions is a consequence of and
reinforces the blurring of the separation between legal orders.
Second, at the institutional level, national courts of some states can increasingly be thought of as part of a comprehensive system of international
law adjudication, in a realization of Scelle's theory of the didoublement
fonctionnel (or "role splitting").7 1 In many (but certainly not all) parts of the
See supra Part I.D.
75.
See generally Andrd Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility
76.
and State Responsibility in InternationalLw, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 615 (2003) (discussing
the interplay between the responsibility of individuals and states); Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao,
International Crimes and State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY,

supra note 21, at 63.
Janne Nijman & Andr6 Nollkaemper, Introduction to NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE
77.
DIVIDE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 1, 1-14 (Janne Nijman & Andr6 NolIkaemper eds., 2007).
Georges Scelle, Rgles gindrales du droit de la paix, in 46 COLLECTED COURSES OF
78.
THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339, 358 (1933). See generally Antonio
Cassese, Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting" (dddoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 210 (1990) (explaining that the basic idea behind Scelle's

theory is that national institutions have a dual role, both as organs of the state and as organs of
the international legal order, to compensate for the institutional deficiencies at the international level in legislative, adjudicative, and enforcement matters); Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law, in V MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

836 (Ridiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). Dupuy explains that the ap-

plications of the theory of role splitting seem to be expanding:

Such is the case every time the internal legal order helps to compensate the organic deficiencies of the international legal order by providing it with its
competence. Due to a lack of a sufficiently developed international institutional
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world, national courts adjudicate international law claims. Even if one does
not accept that national courts can formally determine situations of international responsibility, 7 they are an intrinsic part of the system of
international accountability. While few, if any, claims against multiple responsible actors have been adjudicated by national courts, this does allow
for the possibility that claims against one state, or more likely a private actor, are litigated in a national court, while claims against other actors that
contributed to a harmful outcome are litigated in another (either foreign or
international) venue. The aforementioned complementary procedures at national and international levels in regard to the Srebrenica genocide illustrate
the point. 0
This permeability of the formal divide between international and national law to some extent resembles the permeability between general public
international law and the internal legal orders of individual international or-

ganizations. Formally, these legal orders are shielded from general
international law. Since international organizations determine whether and
to what extent general international law applies to scenarios arising before
them, general principles of international law regarding shared responsibility
do not usually apply of their own force." However, the boundaries are not
watertight. For instance, according to the ARIO, organizations can be responsible on the basis of decisions that compel state action, even though
such decisions are governed by their internal legal regime.82 Additionally,
internal accountability mechanisms (for instance, noncompliance committees under multilateral environmental agreements) can result in findings
relevant to shared responsibility.8 Both scenarios can contribute to situations of and determinations regarding shared responsibility.
Third, the permeability of international and national legal orders supports the legitimacy of a comparative law methodology in assessing rules of
shared responsibility. Moving beyond the simplistic assessment that intemaframework, international law relies on State organs to guarantee its effective application. These State organs thus 'kill two birds with one stone'. While still acting
within the framework of their competence as it is defined in the national legal order,
they also play a part in the application of international law.
Id. at 858.
79.
Andrd Nollkaemper, InternationallyWrongful Acts in Domestic Courts, 101 AM. J.
INT'L L. 760, 786-98 (1992) (discussing the various arguments in support of and against the
proposition that a national court, finding a violation of an international obligation, can make a
determination of international responsibility).
80.
Andrd Nollkaemper, Multilevel Accountability in InternationalLaw: A Case Study
of the Aftennath of Srebrenica, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING

SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY,

AND SUBSIDIARITY

345, 354-66

(Yuval Shanay & Tomer Broude eds., 2008).
81.
See generallyAhlborn, supra note 10.
82.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 17.
83.
On the relationship between such findings and formal responsibility, see Martti
Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the
Montreal Protocol,3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 123, 123 (1992).
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tional law did not emerge ex nihilo, removed from the domestic legal traditions of the states that compose the international legal order, principles
applicable in domestic legal orders can be relevant to international law. This
applies, for instance, in regard to such concepts as joint and several liability.
While obviously care must be taken against borrowing domestic concepts
"lock, stock and barrel,"" Judge Shahabuddeen rightly observed that nothing in the differences between legal orders requires mechanical disregard of
domestic (or municipal) law in an international adjudication. His observation that "to speak of a joint obligation is necessarily to speak of a municipal
law concept"" has particular relevance for the topic at hand.
In combination, the four trends identified explain the increased frequency with which questions of shared responsibility arise. They also influence
the rise in instances in which such questions will actually be addressed by
international or national institutions. Finally, they shape the development of
international legal principles and procedures that relate to shared responsibility. It is against this background that we now must examine the main
principles of international law relevant to questions of shared responsibility.

III. OVERARCHING

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
RELEVANT TO SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Questions of shared responsibility are not new to international law. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has considered aspects of shared responsibility in several cases. 86 For instance, in the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ
adjudicated a claim against Albania for its failure to warn the United Kingdom of the presence of mines; it was simultaneously alleged that (the
former) Yugoslavia had contributed to the injury suffered by the United
Kingdom as it had actually laid the mines in Albanian waters.87 Other examples include the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case (involving the

possible shared responsibility of Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom for mismanagement of Nauruan resources)," the East Timor
case (involving the possible shared responsibility of Australia and Indonesia for violation of the right of self-determination of East Timoreans),"9
84.
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 126, 148
(June 11) (separate opinion of Judge McNair).
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections,
85.
Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240, 290 (June 26) (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). Shahabuddeen made these comments in the context of dealing with the question whether Australia
could be sued alone even when it was part of a common organ with New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, which had collectively administered the state of Nauru.
86.
Andrd Nollkaemper, Issues of Shared Responsibility Before the InternationalCourt
of Justice, in EVOLVING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF KAREL
C. WELLENS 199, 200-01 (Eva Rieter & Henri de Waele eds., 2012).
87.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, Judgment, 1947 I.C.J. 4, 15-17 (Apr. 9).
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. 240.
88.

89.

East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
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and the Legality of the Use of Force cases (involving the shared responsibility of NATO states for military actions in the former Yugoslavia in response
to events in Kosovo).90
The ECtHR has likewise addressed questions of shared responsibility.9'
In 2004, for example, the ECtHR had to address the issue of how de facto
control by one state and de jure control by another over a territory affected
the distribution of responsibility between Russia and Moldova over the autonomous region of Transdniestria. 92 The Court found that both states were,
on different grounds, responsible and thus effectively found that responsibility was shared. 93 In 2011, the Court again considered the responsibility of
two states (Belgium and Greece) in relation to the treatment of refugees. 94 It
found that both Greece (for mistreating an asylum seeker) and Belgium (for
sending the asylum seeker in question back to Greece with the knowledge of
potential mistreatment) were responsible for the mistreatment of an asylum
seeker.95
Other international tribunals that have considered questions of shared
responsibility include the Arbitral Tribunal in the Eurotunnel dispute, which
considered whether France and the United Kingdom were jointly responsible for failure to prevent the entry of asylum seekers through the Channel
Tunnel 96 and the Seabed Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea Authority, which affirmed the possibility of joint responsibility
between states that sponsor an entity that engages in the exploration or exploitation of the deep seabed.97
In part based on this case law, the ILC has identified certain principles
relevant to questions of shared responsibility. Both the ILC's ASR and
ARIO contain such principles. For instance, under the principle of complici-

90.
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, Order, 1999
I.C.J. 916 (June 2).
91.

Maarten den Heijer, Issues of Shared Responsibility Before the European Court of

Human Rights (Amsterdam Ctr. for Int'l Law, SHARES Research Paper No. 2012-04,
2012), available at http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Den-HeijerMaarten-Issues-of-Shared-Responsibility-before-the-European-Court-of-Human-Rights-ACIL2012-04 1.pdf.
92.
Ilaqcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 179, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-61886.
93.
Id. 1 331 (Moldova), 392-394 (Russia).
94.
M.S.S. v. Belgium, App. No. 30696/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-103050.
95.
Id. [1281, 323 (Greece); id. J 360, 367-368, 396 (Belgium).
96.
Channel Tunnel Grp. Ltd. v. United Kingdom, Partial Award, [[ 165-169 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2007), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fillid=218.
97.
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS
Rep. 10, 1 192, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no_17/
advop_01021 1.pdf.
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ty, in instances where one state contributes to a wrongful act of another
state, both states can be responsible for their wrongful conduct.98
Based on the work of the ILC and the (limited) international case law, in
this Part we first identify the main features of the dominant legal framework
and discuss how these could be relevant for situations of shared responsibility. Subsequently, we identify the limits of the prevailing principles and note
attempts to mitigate or repair these shortcomings without, however, fundamentally addressing the underlying difficulties.99
A. The Principlesof Independentand Exclusive Responsibility

1. The Dominant Role of the Principles of Independent
and Exclusive Responsibility
The dominant approach of international law to the allocation of international responsibility is based on the notion of "individual" or "independent"
responsibility of states and international organizations. 0 0 Under the principle of independent responsibility, the state or international organization (as
the case may be) is responsible for its own conduct and its own wrongs.
That is, it is responsible for the conduct that is attributable to it and that is
deemed in breach of its obligations. 0 1
The principle of independent responsibility is firmly established in the
ASR. Article 1 provides that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State
entails the international responsibility of that State,"10 2 while Article 2 states
that "[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission" is attributable to the state and constitutes a
breach of an obligation of the state. 103 These basic principles underlie all of
the ASR's subsequent principles." In light of the possibility that a state
could be responsible not only for its own act but also for an act by another,
ILC Special Rapporteur Ago suggested opting for a broader opening article
that would not specify that international responsibility would necessarily attach to the state that had committed the wrongful act in question, such as
98.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 48; ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 47.
For reasons of brevity, this Part will focus primarily on state responsibility. Howev99.
er, this should not be read as an exclusion of the issue of the responsibility of international
organizations in relation to third states. The ARIO generally follow the same logic. Articles on
the Responsibility of International Organizations, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the GeneralAssembly on Its Sixty-Third Session, 66 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 1,

52, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011) [hereinafter ARIO Commentary], reprinted in [2011] 2 YB.
Int'l L. Comm'n (forthcoming).
To prevent confusion with "individual responsibility" as a term that refers to re100.
sponsibility of individuals under international criminal law, in the remainder of this paper we
use the term independent responsibility.

77, art. 47, cmt. 8.

101.

See ASR, supra note 17,

102.
103.

Id. 76, art. 1.
Id. 76, art. 2.

104.

See id. 76, arts. 16-18 (forming an exception).
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"every international wrongful act by a State gives rise to international responsibility."105 However, the ILC was of the opinion that cases in which
responsibility was attributed to a state other than the one that actually committed the internationally wrongful act were so exceptional that they should
not influence the basic principle in Article 1.106 It believed that following
Ago's suggestions would have detracted from the principle's basic force,10 7
and thus a state's responsibility for its own wrongful conduct came to be the
basic rule underlying the ASR.'os
In the ARIO, however, the LLC considered that this model was no longer tenable. Indeed, given that models of personal liability exist side by side
with models of liability for acts of other persons in all legal systems, 1 0 and
given the possibility that international organizations would contribute to the
wrongful acts of member states or vice versa,"o the ILC found the suggestion that the entire law of international responsibility should be based on
responsibility for one's own acts to be unpersuasive. Resembling Ago's
original suggestion, the very first article of the ARIO therefore states that
the Articles apply not only to the responsibility of an international organization for its own wrongful conduct, but also to "the international
responsibility of an international organization for an internationally wrongful act.""' This provision thus covers both cases of responsibility arising out
of the organization's own wrongful conduct and situations in which an in105.

Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Second Rep. on State Responsibility,

U 29-30, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/233 (Apr. 20, 1970) (by Roberto Ago) [hereinafter Second Ago Report].
106.

Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Third Rep. on State Responsibility,

147, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246 & Add. 1-3 (Mar. 5, 1971) (by Roberto Ago)
[hereinafter Third Ago Report].
107.

Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the GeneralAssembly on the Work

of Its Twenty-Fifth Session, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9010/Rev.1
(1973), reprinted in [1973] 2 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 161, 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.
A/1973/Add. 1.
108.
But see ASR, supra note 17, 77, art. 17, cmt. 9 (stating that the directed state can
also be responsible, since the mere fact that it was directed to carry out an internationally
wrongful act does not constitute a circumstance precluding wrongfulness). But see ASR, supra note 17, 76, ch. IV, for an exception to this rule.
109.
EUR. CTR. OF TORT & INS. LAW, UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY OTHERS (J. Spier ed., 2003); EUR. GRP. ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND COMMENTARY, art. 6:102(1) (2005) [hereinafter PETL],

available at http://civil.udg.edu/php/biblioteca/items/283/PETL.pdf ("A person is liable for
damage caused by his auxiliaries acting within the scope of their functions provided that they
violated the required standard of conduct."); COMM'N ON EUR. CONTRACT LAw, PRINCIPLES
OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAw: PARTS I AND II, art. 8:107 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds.,
1998) ("A party which entrusts performance of the contract to another person remains responsible for performance.").
110.
See ARIO, supra note 18, arts. 14-17.
111.
Id. art. 1(1) (emphasis added). Note that the internationally wrongful act is still a
basis for responsibility-which may be questionable in connection to coercion and circumvention. We will come back to this below. See infra Part IV.
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ternational organization incurs international responsibility for conduct other
than its own.'1 2 Thus, such responsibility might flow from conduct that itself
need not be wrongful but that triggers responsibility because it contributes
to wrongful conduct of another state or organization.
The scope and contents of this extension of the basis of responsibility
remains undeveloped, however. The ILC could not provide much evidence
in the practice of states and international organizations to support this possibility of responsibility in connection with the act of another state or
organization.' In the face of this limited practice, it did not venture to suggest the directions in which the law could or should be developed.
The principle of independent responsibility is directly related to the
principle of exclusive responsibility. In practice, conduct is commonly attributed to one actor only. Dual attribution is rare. Although a few scholars
have defended the possibility of dual attribution, in particular in the context
of peacekeeping operations,1' there are few instances of courts recognizing
double attribution."5s At least for some bases of attribution, the ILC has denied the possibility of dual attribution. The commentary to Article 6 of the
ARIO emphasizes that in principle the attribution of wrongful conduct is
6
made on an individual basis and that attribution is an exclusive operation."
This reflects Ago's treatment of acts of organs of a state that are put at the
disposal of another state. In his Third Report, Ago recognized that "it may
be that if another State is given an opportunity to use the services of such
an organ, its demands may not be so exacting as to prevent the organ from
112.

ARIO Commentary, supra note 99,

88, art. 1,cmt. 4.

Id. 88, ch. IV.
113.
Luigi Condorelli, Le Statut des Forces de l'ONU et le Droit InternationalHumani114.
taire, 78 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 881, 897 (1995); Luigi Condorelli, Le Statut
des Forces des Nations Unies et le DroitInternationalHumanitaire,in LES CASQUES BLEUS:
POLICIERS OU COMBATTANTS? / BLUE HELMETS: POLICEMEN OR COMBATANTS? 87, 104-05
(Claude Emanuelli ed., 1997); Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for
Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents Serving As United Nations
Peacekeepers,51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 113, 192 (2010); Aurel Sari, Jurisdictionand International
Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 HuM. RTS.
L. REV. 151, 167 (2008); Nicholas Tsagourias, The Responsibility of International Organisations for Military Missions, in INTERNATIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 245, 253-54 (Marco Odello & Ryszard Piotrowicz eds., 2011) (recognizing the possibility of multiple attribution of conduct to both international organizations and troop-contributing
states).
See, e.g., Rechtbank's-Gravenhage, 10 december 2008, LJN: BF0181/265615;
115.
ILDC 1092, IN 47-49 (NL 2008) (HN v Netherlands) (Neth.). However, the Court of Appeal
departed from this holding and found that one act could both be attributed to the Netherlands
and the United Nations. Hof 's-Gravenhage, 5 juli 2011, JN: BR 5388 (Hasan Nuhanovi6 v
Netherlands) (Neth.); see also Andre Nollkaemper, Dual Attribution: Liability of the Netherlandsfor Conduct of Dutchbat in Srebrenica, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1143, 1145 (2011).
ARIO Commentary, supra note 99, 1 88, art. 7, cmt. 1 ("[T]he problem arises
116.
whether specific conduct of the seconded organ or agent is to be attributed to the receiving organization or to the seconding State or organization."); id. 88, art. 7, cmt. 9.
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continuing to act simultaneously, though independently, as an organ of its
own State."'I' However, he appeared to exclude the possibility that an act of
such an organ would be attributed to both states concerned. He noted that
"[i]n such cases it will be necessary to ascertain in each particularinstance
on whose behalf and by whose authority a specific act or omission has been

committed."'I He also recognized that
[i]t may be that a State at whose disposal a foreign State has
placed a person belonging to its administration will appoint this
person to a post in its [own] service, so that at a given moment
he will formally be an organ of two different States at the same
time."'
However, in such a situation, "the person in question will in fact be acting
only for one of the two States or at all events in different conditions for each
of them."' 20 According to that view, the defining criterion of "genuine and
exclusive authority"' 2' by definition can only be fulfilled for one state at a
time.122
The question whether responsibility of one actor excludes responsibility
of the other arises in particular in those cases where a state is not responsible for its own acts but can be responsible in connection with the wrongful
act of another state.123 It was answered in the affirmative by Ago in relation
to what is now Article 6 of the ARIO.' 24 The ILC eventually decided otherwise,' but the situation remains controversial. For instance, in the case of a
state directing or controlling another state, 2 6 the question may arise whether
the directing state is solely responsible or whether this responsibility is
shared with the subordinate state. Dominic6 answers the question by concurring with Ago: it is only the controlling state that is responsible, "for it is
either that the state is responsible for the act of another carried out under its
117.

Third Ago Report, supra note 106,

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. 201, n.401 (emphasis added).
Id. H202, 206.

122.

See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on State Respon-

201.

sibility, 147, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 & Add.1 (June 30, 1972) (by
Roberto Ago). If, on the other hand, as we have pointed out, the persons concerned, although
acting in the territory of another state, are still under the orders and exclusive authority of their
own state or of the organization to which they belong, any acts or omissions by them are, and
remain, acts of that state or organization. In no circumstances can they be attributed to the territorial state or involve its international responsibility. Id.
123.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, arts. 16-18.
124.

Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Eighth Rep. on State Responsibility,

45, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318 & Add.1-4 (Jan. 24, 1979) (by Roberto
Ago).
125.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 19.
126.
Id. 76, art. 18.
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direction or control, or the dependent state maintains a certain degree of
27
freedom, in which case it is responsible for its own conduct."l He adds that
in the latter case, "the dominant state may have incited the conduct, but
mere incitement is not unlawful." 2 8 Likewise, in the case of coercion, only
the coercing state would be responsible 2 9 even though it may well be argued that even a coerced state has a degree of freedom that would justify
considering it as bearing international responsibility.130
As noted above, the LLC ultimately did not follow Ago's approach, and
both the ASR and the ARIO l 3 1 recognize that state or organizational
responsibility that is incurred as a result of directing and controlling another
(or, in the case of an organization, for adopting decisions that compel
conduct by member states) does not exclude potential responsibility of the
subordinate state or organization.'32 However, application of this principle
remains rare, and the modalities of responsibility sharing remain uncertain.
In the relatively scarce case law, international courts have consistently
upheld the principle of independent responsibility. The ICJ focused on

33
independent wrongdoing in the Corfu Channel and Certain Phosphate

Lands in Naurul34 cases. Likewise, in M.S.S. v. Belgium, the ECtHR
35
considered the responsibility of Belgium and Greece independently. The
Tribunal in the Eurotunnel case also preferred to approach international
responsibility for two states in the framework of a common organ through
the lens of independent responsibility. 6
2. Factors that Explain the Dominance of the Principles
of Independent and Exclusive Responsibility
Two factors in particular explain the dominance of the principles of independent and exclusive responsibility. The first explanatory factor,
specifically applied to states, is the principle of sovereignty, defined in terms
Christian Dominic, Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States and the Implication
127.
of a State in the Act of Another State, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 281,
284-88 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
Id.
128.
Id. at 289.
129.
James D. Fry, Coercion, Causation, and the FictionalElements of Indirect State Re130.
sponsibility,40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 611, 639 (2007).
ARIO, supra note 18, arts. 19, 63; ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 19.
131.
See ARIO, supra note 18, art. 48 (recognizing the possibility of joint responsibil132.
ity); ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 47.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, Judgment, 1947 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
133.
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections,
134.
Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240, 48 (June 26).
M.S.S. v. Belgium, App. No. 30696/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
135.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i--001-103050.
Channel Tunnel Grp. Ltd. v. United Kingdom, Partial Award, 187 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
136.
2007), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.aspfilid=218.

386

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 34:359

of independence and liberty from other states.137 Sovereignty implies that a
state is not responsible for acts of another state (or more generally another
legal person). Just as international criminal law rejects the concepts of collective responsibility or guilt by association, instead relying on the principle
of individual autonomy to limit responsibility to individuals only for their
actual conduct, states resist principles of responsibility that require them to
be responsible for conduct other than their own.
This reticence to hold a state responsible for acts it did not commit is illustrated by the high threshold for attribution of acts by private persons to
states. As the ICJ explained in the Genocide case:
[T]he "overall control" test has the major drawback of broadening
the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility: a State is
responsible only for its own conduct, that is to say the conduct of
persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf... . [T]he "overall
control" test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking
point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a
State's organs and its international responsibility.'13
Just as a state would not accept responsibility for acts of private persons that
it did not effectively control, we cannot expect a state to accept responsibility for acts of other states on the basis of a loose involvement with those
other states.
The second main explanatory factor, which is linked to the principle of
sovereignty, is the inherently consensual nature of most international dispute
settlement mechanisms. For example, the ICJ may only exercise jurisdiction
where both parties have accepted ICJ jurisdiction through a special agreement or compromis, an existing treaty dispute resolution clause, or general
ex ante acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.
Since this effectively means that the ICJ will hear a case only when all parties to a dispute have agreed to it, this limits the opportunities for the Court
to exercise jurisdiction over multiple parties in shared responsibility cases.'" This limits both the individual instances in which the Court will be
able to make findings regarding shared responsibility as well as the possibility that the Court can contribute to the development of the principles
applicable in such situations.
This consensual procedural requirement may be contrasted with
international criminal tribunals established by the Security Council, which
have been endowed with the power to exercise jurisdiction over individuals
137.
At this stage of the Article, we use a traditional approach to "sovereignty" as a historical paradigm and for descriptive purposes.
138.
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 1 406 (Feb. 26).
139.
It is only on a voluntary basis that states can intervene in the proceedings. See, e.g.,
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Application for Permission to Intervene, Order, 2011 I.C.J. 143 (July 4).
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irrespective of their individual consent.14 0 Moreover, these tribunals have
developed concepts such as joint criminal enterprise, thus allowing
individuals to be held responsible for acts with which they were, in some
cases at least, only loosely associated.' 4 ' They also have the power to join
42
related cases, irrespective of the consent of the parties involved.1 The fact
that courts with jurisdiction over states lack the powers of courts with
jurisdiction over individuals has both reduced the possibility of holding
multiple actors responsible and has hampered courts' ability to develop
international law to better deal with questions of shared responsibility.
It should be noted that the situation is not identical among all international courts. The ECtHR's compulsory jurisdiction has allowed it to deal
with a larger number of multidefendant cases.1' Nonetheless, the underlying principle may still be relevant in cases where the legal interests of a
noncontracting state are at issue. In cases of extradition and expulsion, the
Court has made clear that although the establishment of the responsibility of
the expelling state "inevitably involves an assessment of conditions in the
requesting country against the standards of Article 3 of the Convention....
there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of
the receiving country, whether under general international law, under the
Convention or otherwise."'"
Notwithstanding these differences among states, on the whole the principle of independent and exclusive responsibility is firmly entrenched in the
law of international responsibility and the procedural law of institutions that
may apply it.

U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of
140.
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex (May 3, 1993) (annexing the

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocu141.
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 133 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
For an analysis of the concept, see, for example, Harmen van der Wilt, Joint CriminalEnterprise: Possibilitiesand Limitations, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 91 (2007).

See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 64(5), July 17, 1998,
142.
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 45, at 40, r. 48 (Dec. 8, 2010), available at
http://icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules-procedure-evidence/ITO32Rev45_en.pdf.
den Heijer, supra note 91, at 2.
143.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36 (1989), available
144.
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?il-001-57619; Mamatkulov v. Turkey,
2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 295, 67, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
Rep. 730, 126 (2008), available at
search.aspx?i=001-68183; see Saadi v. Italy, 49 Eur. H.R.
00 85276
; Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201
1http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1991), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i-001-57674.
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B. How Independent (and Exclusive) Responsibility
May Be Relevant to Shared Responsibility
While, as is explained in the next Section, the ILC framework has
shortcomings in situations of shared responsibility, it is not powerless in this
regard. Solving questions of shared responsibility as they increasingly arise
in practice does not necessarily, or primarily, require an entire overhaul of
the system of responsibility. It first and foremost requires appreciating what
can be done within the corners of existing law.
Independent responsibility is obviously applicable and adequate in situations of cumulative responsibility where each of the individual acts in itself
is a violation of an international obligation. Moreover, in certain cases, cooperative action may be "debundled" into individual conduct. The principle
of individual responsibility may then be adequate for evaluating cooperative
action. Thus, in the East Timor case, Judge Weeramantry, dissenting with
the majority judgment, noted that "[elven if the responsibility of Indonesia
is the prime source, from which Australia's responsibility derives as a consequence, Australia cannot divert responsibility from itself by pointing to
that primary responsibility."l 45 Australia's own role in regard to the treaty
was therefore sufficient for its (independent) responsibility. And with respect to a situation where two states set up a common organ (for instance,
the Coalition Provisional Authority set up by the United Kingdom and the
United States during the occupation of Iraq), the ILC took the position that
the conduct of the common organ cannot be considered otherwise
than as an act of each of the States whose common organ it is. If
that conduct is not in conformity with an international obligation,
then two or more States will concurrently have committed separate,
although identical, internationally wrongful acts.' 46
Specifically in the context of the ICJ, disaggregating collective action
into individual (wrongful) conduct can have the benefit of making it less
likely that proceedings will be dismissed because a potential party is not in-

145.
In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor, despite it being recognized by the United
Nations as under Portuguese administration. In 1989, Australia recognized that East Timor
was part of Indonesia and both countries signed a treaty to delineate the outline of the continental shelf between Australia and East Timor. Portugal brought the case before the ICJ
claiming that Australia, by recognizing the annexation of East Timor and signing the treaty
with Indonesia, had violated East Timor's right to self-determination. The ICJ refused to address the substance of the claim, in application of the Monetary Gold principle. See East
Timor (Port. v Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 172 (June 30) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Weeramantry); see also infra Part V.C.3.
146.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly on the Work
of Its Thirtieth Session, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/33/10 (1978), re-

printed in [1978] 2 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 1,
A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1

(Part 2).

1 94, art. 27, cmt. 3, U.N. Doc.
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147
volved in the proceedings under the Monetary Gold principle. Also, the
practice of the ECtHR shows that the principle of independent responsibility
allows the assignment of responsibility in cases where two or more states
were, either independently or through cooperative action, involved in a

wrongful act. 148

In sum, there is some room in the current framework to determine and
implement shared responsibility. However, the power of the principle of independent responsibility to address questions of responsibility that arise in
cases where there is a multiplicity of wrongdoing actors is limited in several
aspects, as will now be discussed.
C. The Limitations of Independent Responsibility
Reducing complex relationships to individual state responsibility may,
for a number of reasons, be unlikely to result in a satisfactory outcome. In
combination with the procedural limitations of dispute settlement, the conceptual tools of exclusive individual responsibility of states have led courts
to reduce complex cooperative schemes to binary categories without engag14 9
ing in principled discussions of the shared nature of responsibility. A
noteworthy example is the decision of the ECtHR in Behrami. The Court attributed all acts and omissions relating to the failed demining operations in
Kosovo exclusively to the United Nations, and not its member states, without considering the possibility of a more nuanced solution in which
responsibility would be shared.150 This approach raises the question whether
exclusive responsibility is conducive to a rule-based society in which responsibility fulfills the essential function of ensuring a return to legality and
ensuring that the actors that acted in breach of international law will comply
with their obligations. 15 1 What are the costs of accountability gaps when only one actor is found responsible, even though another actor contributed to
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Preliminary
147.
Question, Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. 19, 31-32 (June 15) (formulating an exception to the principle that the absence of a state that is concurrently or jointly responsible for a wrongful act
does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction). For a recent statement of the principle, see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 127 (Feb. 3,
2012), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.
E.g., den Heijer, supra note 91 (concluding that the European Court of Human
148.
Right's independent-responsibility approach does not necessarily preclude determinations of
multiple responsibility).
See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. U.K.), Provisional
149.
Measures, Order, 1999 I.C.J. 826 (June 2); East Timor (Port. v.Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J.
90 (June 30); Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240 (June 26); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
Merits, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
Behrami v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01, Admissibility Decision (Eur.
150.
Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-80830.
151.
For discussion of the relationship between the rule of law and state responsibility,
see IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 79 (1998).
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the harmful outcome? For instance, if only the directed (and not the directing) state is held responsible, do we have a proper set of principles that
allow us to establish for which part of the injury to a third party it is responsible? If so, is it fair to leave the injured party with the remaining costs? If
not, is it fair to hold the directed state responsible for all injury? The larger
point here is that reducing situations of shared responsibility to individual
responsibility may create an accountability gap that implies costs for the injured parties and the larger system and raises questions of fairness among
the responsible parties.
Two more specific drawbacks can be pointed out in relation to the prevalent system of individual responsibility. First, the normative foundation of
shared responsibility remains unsettled, and often it is not at all clear on
what basis one or more of the actors involved can be held responsible. This
applies both to the question whether dual attribution is possiblel52 and to the
question whether a state or organization can be responsible based on conduct-itself not inherently wrongful-that contributes to a wrongful act
perpetrated by another. As to the latter, the ILC has suggested that in certain
situations shared responsibility may arise from a combination of wrongful
conduct attributable to one actor, on the one hand, and responsibility attributed to another actor. Responsibility thus is not necessarily based on an
act attributed to an actor (state or organization) that is in breach of its obligation, but can also be directly attributed to an actor, even one that was not
engaged in a wrongful act.' Examples of such situations, which almost by
definition raise the possibility of shared responsibility, are the responsibility
of states arising out of aid and assistance,15 4 direction and control,' coercion, 156a combination of decisions of the organization and wrongful acts of
the state(s),1 17 and a combination of attributions of responsibility to a state
(for example, based on direction or control) and wrongful conduct by an organization. 158 However, it remains controversial whether a state's
responsibility arising from the wrongful act of another is based on an independent wrong, a contribution to the conduct, or a contribution to the

152.

See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.

153.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 63.
154.
Id. arts. 14, 58; see also HELMUT PHILIPP AusT, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2011); August Reinisch, Aid or Assistance and Direction and Control
Between States and InternationalOrganizationsin the Commission of Internationally Wrongful Acts, 7 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 63, 66-67 (2010).

155.

ARTO, supra note 18, arts. 15, 59; see also Reinisch, supra note 154, at 73-75.

156.
ARIO, supra note 18, arts. 16, 60; see also Fry, supra note 130, at 618.
157.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 17; see also Niels Blokker, Abuse of the Members: Questions Concerning Draft Article 16 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International
Organizations,7 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 35, 37-39 (2010).
158.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 62; Jean d'Aspremont, Abuse of the Legal Personalityof
InternationalOrganizationsand the Responsibility of Member States, 4 INT'L ORG. L. REV.

91, 98-99 (2007).
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proscribed outcome. 15 9 In the situation where the normative basis for responsibility is undetermined, it is a rather empty proposition to say that the
state or organization to whom responsibility is attributed is responsible on
the basis of its own act; in any case it is not on the basis of its own wrongful
act. The foundations of this construction of responsibility are undertheorized, and their relationship with the normal conditions of wrongfulness not
at all well articulated.
The second, related point is that the principle of independent responsibility in itself provides no basis for the apportionment of responsibility and,
in particular, reparation. In each situation where two or more actors are responsible the question will arise what portion of the injury caused to a third
party the actors are responsible for. As noted in Part I.B above, shared responsibility strictu sensu is characterized by the fact that individual
apportionment based on causation is not possible. If two or more states are
held responsible based on their respective wrongful acts, the question then
may arise how responsibility and reparation will be apportioned between
them if both acts contributed to the injury. As a consequence, the absence of
proper criteria for allocating responsibility may either result in too little or
too much responsibility for a given individual state or other actor.
The absence of proper criteria for allocating responsibility may result in
too little responsibility allocation because of the impossibility of determining with sufficient certainty which of the states involved was responsible for
which wrongdoing, which may effectively prevent a finding of responsibility. An example of this phenomenon was the Saddam Hussein case before
the ECtHR. Saddam Hussein brought a case against twenty-one states that
160
were allegedly implicated in the invasion of Iraq and his capture. The
Court held that as long as the applicant could not identify the specific
wrongful acts of the defendant states, no responsibility of any member state
in connection with either the invasion of Iraq or the detention of Hussein
could be found. 161The decision of the ECtHR in Behrami, while resting on
different grounds, is another example of a case where the application of
principles of responsibility precluded a determination that any actor was responsible. 162
Critically-and this indeed is a major ground of our critique of the existing arrangments for addressing shared responsibility-the involvement of a
multiplicity of actors in cases of concerted action may lead to blame shifting

See Nataga Nedeski & Andrd Nollkaemper, Responsibility of InternationalOrgani159.
zations in Connection with Acts of States, 9 INT'L ORG. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012), available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=207 1179.
Hussein v. Albania, App. No. 23276/04, at *1, *3-4 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006),
160.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-72789.
Id.
161.
See Behrami v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01, Admissibility Decision, at
162.
*17-18 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/siteseng/pages/search.aspx?i-00180830.
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(or "buck passing") between the various actors involved. 16 3 In the Srebrenica
cases, which sought to hold the Netherlands and the United Nations responsible in relation to the eviction of persons from the U.N. compound in
Srebrenica, both defendants denied responsibility; they thus effectively
placed the blame on each other.'" A multiplicity of actors may lead to the
following paradox of shared responsibility: "As the responsibility for any
given instance of conduct is scattered among more people, the discrete responsibility of every individual diminishes proportionately." 65
On the other hand, the lack of a clear conceptual basis for the allocation
of responsibility between multiple actors can result in the assignment of too
much responsibility. As responsibility cannot easily be apportioned, the
result can be that one state is forced to shoulder all of the blame. This was
recognized by Judge Ago, who noted in his dissenting opinion in the Nauru
case that, given the fact that the wrong to Nauru involved concerted action
between Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, it would be on
"an extremely questionable basis" if the ICJ were to hold that Australia was
to shoulder in full the responsibility in question.1 6 6
Our general point here is that the principle of individual responsibility
may not always provide a basis for the task of apportioning responsibilities
among multiple wrongdoing actors. On the basis of what criteria is reparation to which injured parties are entitled to be distributed among multiple
wrongdoers? In the Nauru case, the ICJ did not reach the question of allocation. Judge Shahabuddeen noted that the question whether "Australia alone
can be sued, and, if so, whether it can be sued for the whole damage" was a
matter for the merits. 167 But it is far from obvious how the Court could have
dealt with the question.
The principle of independent responsibility in itself provides no basis
for this task. Article 47 of the ASR deals in some way with this issue.16 1
163.
See generally Christopher Hood, The Risk Game and the Blame Game, 31 Gov'T &
OPPOSITION 15 (2002).
164.

See generally Nollkaemper, supra note 80.

165.
BOVENS, supra note 56, at 46. For a comparable point, see MAY, supra note 24, at
37-38. For further discussion on the subject, see Dennis F. Thompson, Designing Responsibility: The Pmblem of Many Hands in Complex Organizations,in THE DESIGN TURN INAPPLIED

ETHICS (Jeroen van den Hoven et al. eds., forthcoming 2012), available at
http://scholar.harvard.edu/dft/files/designingresponsibilityl -28-11 .pdf.
166.
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. AustI.), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240, 328 (June 26) (dissenting opinion of Judge Ago).
167.
Id. at 286 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
168.
It provides:
1. Where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act,
the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act.
2. Paragraph 1:
(a) does not permit any injured State to recover, by way of compensation,
more than the damage it has suffered;
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However, although this article is a welcome acknowledgement of situations
of multiple wrongdoers, it raises as many questions as it answers. The ILC
declined to express a clear opinion on whether responsibility shared by multiple actors is joint or joint and several, and it provided few answers as to
whether and how any responsibility between multiple responsible parties
should be allocated.
As a consequence, the principle of individual responsibility and the accompanying procedures may undermine the main functions of
responsibility, in particular the restoration of legality and the protection of
the rights of injured parties. If states can effectively shift blame to others
and avoid being held responsible, it is unlikely that they will be required to
change their (wrongful) conduct. Similarly, injured parties, as a result of jurisdictional limitations, may be unable to bring successful claims against
one or more of the responsible parties.169
D. Tentative yet Unsatisfactory Solutions

Two ways to deal with these difficulties would be for the relevant actors
to agree on ex ante arrangements (Subsection 1) or to propose some adjustments to the secondary rules (Subsection 2). However, as will be suggested
below, these approaches are unsatisfactory or at least presuppose a prior
fundamental rethinking of the nature of responsibility and the interests that
it serves (Subsection 3).
1. Relying on Ex Ante Arrangements
First, questions of shared responsibility could be solved by relying on
ex ante arrangements. After all, whether or not two states are jointly responsible for a particular act is first and foremost governed by what states have
actually agreed to, whether in drafting their primary obligations or in
providing for specific secondary rules of responsibility. 0 If states and other
actors wish to prevent the above-noted problems of too much or too little responsibility, they simply should agree on the modalities of sharing ex ante.
We recognize that such ex ante arrangements (whether of a primary or
secondary nature-if that distinction can be made at all"7 ') are of key importance for addressing problems of shared responsibility. The type of
responsibility assigned (whether individual or shared) is to a large extent a
(b) is without prejudice to any right of recourse against the other responsible
States.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 47.
The functions of responsibility are of course open to discussion. This will be dis169.
cussed in more detail in Part IV (discussing the public and private dimensions of international
responsibility).
165-167 (Perm.
Channel Tunnel Grp. Ltd. v. United Kingdom, Partial Award,
170.
Ct. Arb. 2007), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?filid=218.
171.
See infra Part 111.D.3.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

394

[Vol. 34:359

function of the nature of the underlying obligations. In the event that states
accept a joint obligation, 17 2 or when obligations provide for collective action,"' shared responsibility may be implied in case of breach. 174 If, to the
contrary, obligations provide for individual action, no questions of shared
responsibility need arise (though they may arise, for instance in the case of
cumulative responsibility).7 5
The prospect of litigation in situations of shared responsibility, precisely
in light of the uncertain rules of apportionment of responsibility, and in particular reparation, may induce states to clarify their respective obligations
and responsibilities beforehand. While responsibility as we construe it refers
essentially to a retrospective process (involving accounting for prior conduct), it may also trigger prospective negotiations and standard setting. An
example of this can be seen in the agreements made by states with respect to
climate change under the Kyoto Protocol, which can be considered an ex
ante apportionment of responsibility. 176
The criteria that may be used in apportioning responsibilities ex ante
may not be dissimilar from those used to apportion responsibilities after
harm is caused. Criteria such as capacity, contribution, control, and causation will be relevant both when states ex ante agree who is to carry what
burden and when courts make ex post facto determinations of responsibility.177

By providing clarity on such points, the possibilities that parties will be
willing to entrust adjudication of claims of shared responsibility to courts
may increase.17 1

172.

For a discussion of this concept, see Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v.

Austl.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240, 280-93 (June 26) (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
173.
See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29, art. 2(2) ("The Parties included in Annex I
shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.").
174.
Channel Tunnel Grp. Ltd. v. United Kingdom, Partial Award, 167 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2007), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil-id=218.
175.

See supra Part I.C.

176.

See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 29, art. 2(2); see also Christopher D. Stone,

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 276,

276-81 (2004).
177.
See infra Part V.B.l.a.
178.
Cf David Caron, The Basis of Responsibility: Attribution and Other Transsubstantive Rules, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO
THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 109, 163 (Richard B. Lillich et al. eds., 1998) ("[lIt will
[not] be simple for arbitrators to determine the percentage of contribution or [for] States [to]
feel comfortable with leaving such a difficult determination to arbitrators.").
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2. Modifying the General Secondary Principles of Responsibility
A second possible approach to the difficulties identified would be to develop principles of shared responsibility to fill the "gaps" of the ILC Articles
and to ensure that the law of responsibility better addresses questions of
shared responsibility. Such principles could replace the fiction of exclusive
attribution (for example, under Articles 6 or 18 of the ASR) with a more express acknowledgement of the possibility of dual attribution or a
79
combination of attribution of conduct and attribution of responsibility.1
These principles could also clarify how to divide responsibility and damages
between multiple tortfeasors, including the role of causation, the legal basis
for a responsible state to claim part of the damages due from a coresponsible state, and a development of how such dual responsibilities would relate
to each other.1 s0
The LLC has to some extent proceeded in this direction. The ARIO are a
noteworthy improvement over the ASR in that they acknowledge that organizations can be responsible in connection with wrongful acts of states, and
vice versa, and openly recognize the possibility that the responsibility of an
organization does not exclude responsibility of one or more states,' 8' and
vice versa.18 2 As we have indicated above, however, the scope of this expanded basis of responsibility remains unclear. The ILC could not provide
much evidence in the practice of states and international organizations to
support this rule, and consequently its foundations and consequences remain
undetermined. 83
Additionally, the ILC has to some extent accommodated the possibility
of shared responsibility in Article 47 of the ASR, providing that if two states
are responsible for the same wrongful act, each state can be held
responsible. 8 4 Article 48 of the ARIO contains a comparable provision.8 5
While these articles provide for independent responsibility, the possibility of
parallel or concurrent independent wrongs makes them directly relevant to
questions of shared responsibility. However, as also indicated above, Article
47 of the ASR and Article 48 of the ARIO have little normative content and,
moreover, raise several questions. The core question raised is the following:
What is the meaning of the requirement that the separate conduct of two or
179.

See Fry, supra note 130, at 638.

Dominic, supra note 127.
180.
See, e.g., ARIO, supra note 18, art. 19 ("This Chapter is without prejudice to the
181.
intemational responsibility of the State or international organization which commits the act in
question, or of any other State or international organization.").
Id. art. 63.
182.
See text accompanying supra note 113.
183.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 47.
184.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 48(1) ("Where an international organization and one or
185.
more States or other international organizations are responsible for the same internationally
wrongful act, the responsibility of each State or organization may be invoked in relation to
that act.").
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more states or international organizations results in the "same wrongful
act"?
From the commentary to the ARIO, it appears that the ILC considered
that two or more states or international organizations could be responsible
for the same wrongful act.' 8 6 Some of the examples given in the commentary to Article 48 of the ARIO indeed may concern "the same wrongful act."
This holds true in particular for direction and control,'8 7 coercion,"18 and circumvention of international obligations through decisions and
authorizations,' 9 though in some circumstances the situations covered by
these articles may involve different wrongful acts (for example, when a decision of an organization as such is in contravention of an international
obligation).
Apart from the less-than-perfect fit between principle and examples,
there are fundamental problems with defining joint responsibility in terms of
the "same wrongful act" rather than (as is done in some domestic systems)
in terms of the "same injury"1 90 or, as we propose in this Article, in terms of
a single harmful outcome. The first problem is that it may be underinclusive,
as it excludes the possibility of shared responsibility of an organization and
a state committing different wrongful acts resulting in a harmful outcome.
One example is the situation where two or more states commit independent
wrongs resulting in a single harmful outcome.' 9' Another example is aid and
assistance (or "complicity"). There is good authority for the proposition that
both the state or organization committing the wrongful act and a state or organization aiding it can be jointly responsible for the result produced.19 2
This conforms with the principles of European tort law.'9 It appears that
that the ILC intended to follow this approach, and it used the term "joint responsibility" to refer to responsibility triggered by aid or assistance to a
state that commits an international wrong.194 However, it is somewhat of a
stretch to construe these separate wrongs as the "same wrongful act," as the
aiding state or organization is, strictly speaking, not responsible for the same
wrongful act as the state that committed the principal wrong. Aid and assistance is defined precisely by the fact that it is a separate, not the same,
186.
ARIO Commentary, supra note 99, 88, art. 48, cmt. 2 (discussing situations where
an international organization and a state are responsible for the same wrongful act, that is,
jointly responsible).
187.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 15.
188.
See id. art. 16.
189.
Id. art. 17; see also Blokker, supra note 157, at 39; d'Aspremont, supra note 158, at
92.
190.
On the failure to recognize the role of legal injury, see Stem, supra note 21, at 98115.
191.

See supra Part I.C.
IAN BROWNLIE, 1 SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONs: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 7-8
(1983); MAY, supra note 24, at 37-39; Orakhelashvili, supra note 71, at 258.

192.
193.
194.

PETL, supra note 109, art. 9: 101(1)(a).
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 14; see also Reinisch, supra note 154, at 65.
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wrong.'9 - It might well be argued that it is only if aid and assistance reaches
a certain threshold-for example, if the aiding state makes a significantenough contribution to the wrong-that we speak of joint responsibility.196
But in that case, aid and assistance would no longer be a separate wrong. If
aid and assistance as such is to be considered as an example of joint responsibility, as the ILC apparently intended, it cannot be based on the concept of
joint responsibility for the same wrongful act. Rather, it must be defined differently, such as joint responsibility for the injury or harm that the wrong
causes to third parties.
A better conceptual foundation for joint (and thus shared) responsibility
may be found in defining joint responsibility not in terms of a contribution
to a single wrongful act, but in terms of contribution to a harmful outcome
(that may encompass injury to individual states), as also suggested in our
conceptual approach to shared responsibility.197 In some domestic legal systems, joint responsibility does not refer to some abstract responsibility for a
single act but rather to the possibility that injured parties possess a claim to
provide reparation for indivisible injury against each of the responsible actors.'9 It would seem that if joint responsibility is to be a useful concept in
international law, it should likewise be defined in terms of what injured parties, or international institutions, can demand of each of the responsible
states. Allowing injured parties to direct a claim at each of the responsible
actors only makes sense if combined with injury-based reparation. Indeed,
allowing third parties to direct a claim-which necessarily is based on the
same injury-toward all responsible actors is the reason why provision is
made for joint responsibility at all. However, as we will explain below, this
option needs to be qualified in terms of the mixed private-public nature of
international responsibility.
3. The Elusive Character of These Solutions
The previous comments indicate that both reliance on rules agreed to ex
ante by the parties or on technical changes to a few secondary rules can go
some way toward solving problems of shared responsibility. However, their
scope may be limited, and they necessarily require a fundamental reflection
on the grounds and nature of shared responsibility.
As to ex ante rules, while states and organizations may consider including such provisions in future arrangements, it is not realistic to expect an
overhaul of the large number of existing treaty arrangements. In any case,
this solution is unlikely to work for customary international law.
195.
AusT, supra note 154, at 289.
196.
For a discussion of the need for differentiation, see id. at 219-20; Bernhard Graefrath, Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility, 29 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 370, 373 (1996) (stating that the ILC Draft Articles "seemed to leap the barrier between secondary and primary rules").
197.
See supra Part I.B.
198.
PETL, supra note 109, arts. 10:101, 10:104.
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Even if there is an ex ante allocation of responsibility, it is unlikely to
address all aspects of shared responsibility, in relation to issues such as
fault, causation, quantum, criteria for reparations, and so on. There will always be a need for a more general and comprehensive set of secondary rules
dealing with international responsibility. 199
The fundamental problem that will arise when relying on new primary
rules or adjustment of rules of secondary responsibility is that the question
is not so much whether this can be done, but rather in which direction it
should be done. We submit that formulating a set of primary rules or new
secondary principles raises fundamental conceptual, methodological, and
political challenges. Given the normative implications of alternatives, formulating principles on shared responsibility can hardly be conceived as
merely a technical exercise. It would be intellectually unsatisfactory, akin to
adding floors to a building without considering its foundations. As indicated
above, the shortcomings in the system that the ILC has created in the ASR
(notably Article 47) and in the ARIO (Articles 14 through 17 and 48) raise a
range of questions that are not easily answered in view of ambiguities in the
law of responsibility itself and that require consideration of the very foundations of the law of responsibility.
The next Part explains that the fundamental changes in the international
legal order that give rise to situations in which shared responsibility may occur require a fundamental reflection on how international law can
accommodate such changes.
IV. NEW

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY:
DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY

Against the background of the fundamental changes identified in Part II,
the following Sections will revisit three foundations of the current law of international responsibility that are of central importance to the principles and
procedures relevant to shared responsibility, namely the unity of international responsibility, the dichotomy between primary and secondary norms, and
the dichotomy between responsibility and liability. Based on these findings,
the final Section of this Part will suggest a new, more differentiated approach to shared responsibility.
A. Moving Away from the Unity of the Law of
InternationalResponsibility
How we address questions of shared responsibility depends in part on
our understanding of the nature and aims of international responsibility.
Questions of joint and several liability are strongly associated with a private
law paradigm and involve a transposition of notions of private law to the
199.
See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained
Regimes in InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483, 484-85 (2006).
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public international sphere. Tellingly, in his separate opinion in the Oil Platforms case, Judge Simma examined private law principles and derived from
them a general principle of law. 2m Alford similarly compares national legal
systems to identify a possible principle of joint (and several) liability in international law. 201 However, it may be possible to conceive of shared
responsibility in terms that are less associated with private law regimes. For
instance, in the Legality of the Use of Force case, the proposition by the
counsel for Yugoslavia that NATO states were involved in a joint enterprise 2 02 has as many connotations with the notion of joint criminal enterprise
in international criminal law as it does with private law. More generally, it
seems that a concept of shared responsibility that is based on domestic private law analogies and that fulfills functions that are comparable to private
law can only capture part of the modem practice of international responsibility.
We argue that the concept of shared responsibility can encompass several legal phenomena, some of which are more akin to private law concepts,
and some of which more resemble public law ones. The developments identified in Part II sustain and strengthen both aspects, making it more difficult
for one set of principles to cater to both interests. In effect, we need to "debundle" the dominant notion of the law of international responsibility as a
unitary phenomenon.
1. What Is the Unity of International Responsibility?
The common understanding is that the rules of the international responsibility of states and the responsibility of international organizations form
a single, unitary system. 203 It is advanced by some that since the international legal system is fundamentally different from domestic legal
systems, domestic notions of private or public law cannot easily be transposed to the international level. Pellet rightly warned against undue
reliance on domestic analogies when he wrote that international responsi204
bility is neither public nor private, but "simply international."
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 354-58 (Nov. 6) (separate
200.
opinion of Judge Simma). The Oil Platforms case was brought by Iran against the United
States and concerned the destruction of three offshore oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in
1987 and 1988. The United States brought a counterclaim arguing that Iran had also violated
international law by laying mines. Id. 9 (opinion of the court). It was not clear, however,
whether particular mines had been laid by Iran or Iraq. Id. This led Judge Simma to discuss
the principle of joint and several liability. Id. at 354-58 (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
Alford, supra note 11, at 240-41.
201.
Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. U.K.), Verbatim Record, 16 (May
202.
12, 1999, 10 a.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 11/4485.pdf.
James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of InternationalRespon203.
sibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 442,451 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
Pellet, supra note 51, at 433-34; accordAlain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibil204.
ity in InternationalLaw, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 127, at

3,3-16.
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International law does not distinguish between contractual and tortious responsibility or between civil, criminal, or other forms of public law
(administrative) responsibility of states or international organizations.2 05
What is meant by the law of responsibility as a unitary system is that
the various forms of responsibility (responsibility based on fault, responsibility based on damage, ordinary wrongs, wrongs arising out of serious
breaches of peremptory norms, and so forth) are subject to the same general
principles of responsibility and that they form a relatively coherent whole.
For instance, it is thought (though not without controversy206) that serious
breaches of peremptory norms are subject to the same principles of attribution, defenses, and reparation as ordinary wrongful acts.2 07 In the Genocide
case, the ICJ stated that the particular characteristics of genocide do not justify the Court's departure from the criteria for attribution as they apply
under general international law. 208
The question is whether principles that might be applicable to shared
responsibility, de lege lata or de lege ferenda, can be captured within this
single unitary system. We argue that there is reason to be critical of the unitary perspective and that it has hampered the development of international
law's ability to fulfill the necessary functions in regard to shared responsibility.
At the outset, therefore, it is necessary to identify the distinct private
and public law dimensions of international responsibility.
2. The Private Law Dimensions of International Responsibility
International responsibility traditionally has served the interests of individual states (rather than the public interest).209 In this respect, it shares a
dominant feature with private law. 2 10 The core of the traditional law of international responsibility is the notion of legal injury of individual states
205.
See Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215 (1990); Crawford & Olleson,
supra note 203, at 451-52.
206.
See Georges Abi-Saab, Whatever Happened to Article 19, in FRIEDEN IN FREIHEIT
821, 827-28 (Andreas Fischer-Lescano et al. eds., 2008); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Action publique et crime internationalde l'Etat:Apropos de l'article 19 du projetde la Commission du
Droit Internationalsur la responsabilitddes Etats, 25 ANNUAIRE FRAN AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 539, 539 (1979); Shabtai Rosenne, State Responsibility and InternationalCrimes:
Further Reflections on Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 30 N.YU. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 145, 153 (1997).
207.
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26).
208.
Id. 379. For a brief discussion of whether attribution in cases of serious breaches
of peremptory norms are necessarily governed by the same principles as ordinary wrongs, see
Nollkaemper, supra note 76, at 626-27.
209.
Albert Bleckmann, The Subjective Right in Public InternationalLaw, 28 GER. Y.B.
INT'L L. 144, 144 (1985).
210.
Richard Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1425, 1433 (2003).
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caused by breaches of the law by other states.21 Anzilotti wrote that responsibility derives its raison d'etre from the violation of a right of another
state. 2 12 In view of these structural similarities, Lauterpacht concluded that
public international law "belongs to the genus private law," 213 and Holland
said that international law is "private law writ large." 2 14 There indeed is a
remarkable overlap between the key principles of international responsibility, as partly codified by the ILC, and the Principles of European Tort
Law-an authoritative set of principles that, to a large extent, are common
to domestic systems in Europe. 215 This private law dimension remains relevant to shared responsibility. Principles such as causation,216 contribution to
the injury by the injured state,217 responsibility based on negligence or lack
of due diligence, 218 defenses, 2 19 and reparation 22 0-all recognized in the
Principles of European Tort Law-are relevant for apportioning responsibility and damages among multiple wrongdoing states.'
3. The Public Law Dimensions of International Responsibility
However, modem international law of responsibility also has a distinct
public law dimension. The law of responsibility as construed by the ELC is
objective in nature, in the sense that responsibility can arise regardless of

Stern, supra note 21, at 94-95.
Dionisio Anzilotti, Teoria generaledella responsabilit dello Stato nel diritto inter212.
nazionale, in OPERE DI DIONIsio ANZILOTTI (1956), cited in Second Ago Report, supra note
211.

105, U 29-30.
213.

HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATION-

AL LAw 81 (1927).
214.

T.E. HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (Oxford, Clarendon Press

1898).
For example, Article 6:102 of the Principles of European Tort Law, like principles
215.
of international responsibility, extends liability to "the damage caused by . .. auxiliaries."

PETL, supra note 109, art. 6:102.
216.

Compare PETL, supra note 109, art. 3:101, with Application of Convention on Pre-

vention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v Serb. & Montenegro),
Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 462 (Feb. 26) (discussing the formulation of the standard of causation by the ICJ).
Compare PETL, supra note 109, arts. 3:106, 8:101, with ASR, supra note 17, 176,
217.
art. 39.
218.

Compare PETL, supra note 109,

art. 4:101-:102, with RICCARDO PISILLO

MAZZESCHI, "DUE DILIGENCE" E RESPONSABILITA INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI 23 (1989)

(discussing the due-diligence standards in international law).
Compare PETL, supra note 109, art. 7:101, with ASR, supra note 17, 1 76, arts. 20219.
27.
Compare PETL, supra note 109, art. 10:101, with ASR, supra note 17,1 76, art. 31.
220.
See also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 354-58 (Nov. 6)
221.
(separate opinion of Judge Simma) (discussing the influence of domestic tort law on general
principles).
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damage to any particular state or organization.2 2 2 Both the ASR and the
ARIO provide for two conditions for the existence of an internationally
wrongful act: the act must breach an obligation of the state, and the act must
be attributable to the state.2 2 3 There is no mention of damage or injury. 22 4
Responsibility thus is not contingent upon a showing that a disputed act has
caused injury to a state or other person to whom an international obligation
is owed, but rather is premised on the notion of an illegal act. 225 In this construction, the law of international responsibility does not only protect the
rights of injured parties but protects the international legal order as such
against acts that violate international law. 226
One practical consequence of the elimination of damage as a condition
of responsibility is that the obligations of cessation, continued performance,
and reparation are not contingent on invocation by a responsible state.
Whereas reparation traditionally was considered a right of the injured state
in the traditional law of state responsibility, the ILC-following the lead of
Roberto Ago-took the position that the obligation to provide reparation is
not dependent on a prior invocation of responsibility. 227 The ILC thus introduced the protection of legality as a freestanding legal objective. Indeed, the
obligation of cessation 228 and the obligation to provide guarantees of nonrepetition 229 have more to do with a return to legality than with reparation. 23 0
222.
See Pellet, supra note 51. Another way of illustrating this irrelevance of legal injury
is its inclusion in the notion of wrongfulness itself. See Dionisio Anzilotti, La responsabilitd
internationaledes ttats 6 raison des dommages soufferts par des itrangers, 13 REVUE G9NERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5, 13 (1906) ("Le dommage se trouve compris

implicitement dans le caractbre antijuridique de l'acte. La violation de la rigle est effectivement toujours un ddrangement de l'intir& qu'elle protege, et, par voie de consdquence, aussi
du droit subjectif de la personne Alaquelle l'int6r8t appartient.").
223.
See ARIO, supra note 18, art. 4; ASR, supra note 17, 176, art. 2.
224.
See ARIO, supra note 18, art. 4; ASR, supra note 17, T 77, art. 2, cmt. 9.
225.

Alain Pellet, Remarques sur une rdvolution inachevie, le projet d'articlesde la CDI

sur la responsabilitgdes tats,

42 ANNUAIRE FRAN7AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7, 101 (1996).

226.
Stern, supra note 21, at 95 (noting that it would introduce a "review of legality
through the institutions of international responsibility").
227.
According to Pellet, "Ago's revolution" is most evident in Article 1 of the ASR,
which simply states that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the intemational responsibility of that State," ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 1, without any reference to
injury. Alain Pellet, The ILC's Articles on State Responsibility, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 127, at 75, 76-77; see also Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility, Third Rep. on State Responsibility, 26, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc.

A/CN.4/507 (Mar. 15, 2000) (by James Crawford) [hereinafter Third Crawford Report]
("[T]he general obligation of reparation arises automatically upon the commission of the internationally wrongful act. That obligation is not, as such, contingent upon a demand or
protest by any injured State, even if the form that reparation should take in the circumstances
may be contingent.").
228.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 30(a).
229.
Id. 76, art. 30(b).
230.
But see Stern, supra note 21, at 102 (arguing that both legal consequences can be
based on the notion of injury).
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While a few states have voiced their concern about the fundamental nature
of the shift in the law of international responsibility that was brought on by
the introduction of the notion of objective responsibility,23' most states appear to have few problems with the notion. 23 2
Basing responsibility on illegality rather than injury is a significant
symbolic step toward a more public law-oriented law of responsibility. This
step is further buttressed by the above-mentioned developments of interdependence 233 and moralization. 2 34 This conceptual move may have important
benefits as it could redress a fundamental weakness of the traditional law of
international responsibility: the fact that the absence of invocation (for political or other reasons) rendered the law of responsibility nonoperational in
regard to acts that upset the international legal order.
Construing responsibility as not based on injury to individual states also
allows us to better consider questions of shared responsibility as these arise
in the context of multilateral agreements that protect the collective interests
of the parties. Several aspects of joint liability as it has developed in a domestic law context cannot be easily transplanted into such a public law
context. While, for instance, joint responsibility in regard to transboundary
environmental harm may function in a way that resembles its domestic tort
law origins (for instance when two upstream riparian states cause damage to
a downstream state), joint responsibility functions in a different way in settings that resemble public or administrative law: for instance, in the context
of noncompliant institutions under multilateral environmental agreements.
While these institutions do not make formal determinations of state responsibility,2 35 they make findings on whether states meet their obligations and,
if not, what consequences result.
However, the rejection of injury as a necessary constitutive element of
(shared) responsibility does not mean that we must discard the concept of
injury altogether. Indeed, it remains a critical element of those cases where
multiple actors interfere with the rights of third parties.

France, in its comments on the ILC draft articles, commented that draft Article I of
231.
the Articles on State Responsibility was not acceptable because it attempts to set up an international public order and to defend objective legality rather than subjective rights of states.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Comments and Observations Received from Governments, at 31, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/488 (Mar. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Comments and Observations]; see also Stern,
supra note 21, at 99.
232.
233.
234.

Comments and Observations, supra note 231, at 31.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.

235.

Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann, ConstitutionalisingSecondary Rules in Global Envi-

ronmental Regimes: Non-compliance Procedures and the Enforcement of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, 24 J. ENvTL. L. 103 (2012) (discussing the informal enforcement

of multilateral environmental agreements by noncompliance institutions); Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal
Protocol, 3 YB. INT'L ENVTL. L., 123, 123-28 (1992) (discussing the "open ended" informal
enforcement of the Montreal Protocol).
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4. Downsides of Maintaining Unity
It appears from the discussion above that the law of international responsibility encompasses quite distinct concepts and principles, all serving
different functions. It may be said that these concepts and principles have
coexisted without major difficulty, and that the unitary approach to the law
of responsibility can simultaneously serve a multitude of functions. However, we argue that precisely in relation to shared responsibility, the unitary
nature of international responsibility shows its limitations and helps to explain why the system is devoid of the necessary principles, procedures, and
mechanisms that allow it to address shared responsibility.
Retaining the unitary approach has a number of negative consequences
for the role that the law of international responsibility can play in addressing
questions of shared responsibility. For one, the application of the current
rules in this unitary context creates a certain substantial and institutional
ambiguity. Moreover, unity can only be maintained to the detriment of the
refinement of certain rules that apply to both the private and public dimensions of international responsibility.
a. Substantial and Institutional Ambiguity
It is not always easy to reconcile the private and public law aspects of
rules on state responsibility. For example, while causation may be less relevant in the public law dimension of international responsibility, it will be
key for its private law dimension. Likewise, while the notion of injury to individual states seems pivotal in a private law approach to international
responsibility,2 3 6 it is much less central and arguably even superfluous in a
public law perspective.
While on paper all forms of responsibility may be subjected to similar
conditions and conceptual strictures, the resolution of ambiguity is only spurious. For instance, responsibility, abstracted from any particular injured
party who may seek relief, becomes a rather esoteric notion. It is not easy to
see how a court or other institution could consider a case of responsibility,
determine injury, and fashion appropriate relief if there are no injured parties. 237
Clinging to unity also creates tensions with respect to the institutional
role of international courts. The emphasis that the ECtHR now places on
guarantees of nonrepetition, as well as its resort to "pilot-judgments," may
signal its increasing constitutional role in the protection of legality, but also
may make the ECtHR less accessible for compensation claims-and thus

236.
237.

See Stern, supra note 21, at 94-95.
It has been written that these public forms of international responsibility are platonic. NGUYEN Quoc DINH ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 765 (6th ed. 1999).
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conflict with an approach based on individual injury.238 These effects are
primarily a consequence of organizational problems of the ECtHR, but they
also are a necessary consequence of the use of competing public and private
law conceptions of the role of the Court.
The example of the International Criminal Court is also telling. Indeed,
although not directly related to state responsibility, it illustrates the tensions
that arise when both public and private interests are expected to be promoted
within a single institution. By adding a civil reparations dimension to the
Rome Statute,2 39 and more generally providing for the participation of victims in the criminal process, 24 0 the drafters have burdened this Court with
finding a balance between vastly competing interests, most notably the
rights of the victims and the rights of the defense.
b. Unity at the Cost of Refinement
Maintaining unity may come at the cost of refinement, detail, and progress in those areas where there is no common ground. Both the principles
of responsibility applying to reparation for injury and the principles serving
a more public law function remain relatively primitive as a result of the attempt to keep them together. It may be true that they do not stand in the way
of finding more refined solutions in particular cases, but it also is true that
they do not help, in effect leaving everything to the judge if a sharedresponsibility dispute ends up in court.
As to principles governing reparation, a number of issues related to
their application in cases of multiple culpable parties remain underdeveloped. Examples include questions of extinctive prescription,24' joint and
several liability,24 2 and causation. 243 Perhaps such lacunae often go unnoticed because of the fact that few interstate claims actually lead to monetary

238.
See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness As a Deep StructuralPrinciple of the EuropeanHuman Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J.

L. 125, 147-57 (2008).
Rome Statute, supra note 142, art. 75; see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY TO THE ROME STATUTE 878-83 (2010)
INT'L

239.

(discussing Article 75); Carla Ferstman, The ReparationRegime of the International Criminal
Court:PracticalConsiderations,15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 667 (2002) (discussing Article 75).
240.

Rome Statute, supra note 142, art. 68(3); see also Claude Jorda & Jerome de

Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1412 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002);

Carsten Stahn et al., Participationof Victims in Pre-trialProceedings of the ICC, 4 J.
CRIM. JUST. 219,

241.

See KAJ HosiR, EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION AND APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERSTATE

ARBITRATION

242.

INT'L

219-20 (2006).

16 (2001).

See Noyes & Smith, supra note 12, at 232.

243.
See TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2006); Frangois Rigaux, InternationalResponsibility and the Principleof
Causality,in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY, supra note 21, at 81.
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damages, 2" but the increasing judicialization of the law of international responsibility2 45 may make the need for a developed system of "private
wrongs" for the handling of international claims more important. The absence of developed principles for handling civil claims will, for instance, be
felt in the virtual absence of private law principles that the International
Criminal Court can apply in handling claims by a victim. The Rome Statute
does not provide any rules on principles of compensation of victims, and
there is no clear body of principles that the Court can draw on.2' Also, the
ECtHR has been compelled to develop its own lex specialison questions of
compensation. 247
Additionally, the public law dimensions of the law of international responsibility remain relatively undeveloped and have been dealt with in an
unprincipled and ad hoc manner, mostly outside the law of international responsibility. Given the fact that the unitary nature of the law of
responsibility leaves little room for detailing such principles, as they might
become inconsistent with other principles, states and organizations have
opted to develop public law-type principles (now often discussed in terms
of global administrative law 24 8) outside the law of responsibility.
The preference of relevant actors for addressing public-order aspects
arising out of nonperformance of international obligations outside the law of
international responsibility can by explained by obvious political reasons.
One explanation for the demise of the concept of state crimes is the fact that
states preferred to leave the consequences of serious violations of fundamental international norms to political organs, notably the U.N. Security
Council. 24 9 More generally, states and international organizations do not
treat public-order questions in terms of responsibility. They do not consider
noncompliance mechanisms under international environmental treaties as a

244.
It is noteworthy, however, that in practice compensation regularly takes precedence
over other forms of reparation, in particular restitution. For a discussion of the rather theoretical primacy given to restitution, see Christine Gray, The Different Forms of Reparation:
Restitution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 127, at 589.
245.
See infra Part V.C.1.
246.
See Gioia Greco, Victims'Rights Overview Under the ICC Legal Framework: A JurisprudentialAnalysis,7 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 531, 534 (2007).
247.
Matti Pellonptil, Individual ReparationClaims Under the European Convention on
Human Rights, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATION IN INSTANCES
OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 110 (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian To-

muschat eds., 1999).
248.
See Kingsbury et al., supra note 32, at 54; see also Benedict Kingsbury & Richard
B. Stewart, Legitimacy and Accountability in Global Regulatory Governance: The Emerging
Global Administrative Law and the Design and Operation of Administrative Tribunals of International Organizations,in INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN A CHANGING
WORLD: UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CONFERENCE 1, 17 (Spyridon Flogaitis

ed., 2008).
249.
See, e.g., Comments and Observations, supra note 231, at 53.
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matter of international responsibility. 25 0 Indeed, noncompliance mechanisms
are precisely a response to the limits of the conceptual structures and limitations of the classic doctrine of state responsibility. 25 1Such procedures are
not primarily concerned with providing redress and reparation for victims
but are instruments to secure control of public power, to limit abuses of
power, and to further the rule of law. These noncompliance mechanisms
more resemble a public law concept of ultra vires acts and, in many respects, may be more akin to constitutional or administrative law

principles. 25 2

This approach to address acts that are not in conformity with international law outside the law of responsibility may be an area of potential
growth for shared responsibility, in that it may create a layer of legal processes short of international responsibility.
However, while there has been some development of such public mechanisms through the notion of global administrative law, the nature and
content of the accountability principles and their relationship with the law of
responsibility 253 remains ill developed, in particular where it concerns principles relevant to situations of shared responsibility. 25 4
We do recognize that the principles of reparation as they are laid out in
the ASR and the ARIO allow for a wide variety of legal consequences that
may be tailored to particular circumstances and that take into account the
nature of the obligation, the nature of the breach, and the public nature of
the interests at stake. Indeed, it may be argued that the law as formulated by
the ILC, while not perfect, offers sufficient flexibility to address questions
of shared responsibility.
However, two comments are in order. First, it is precisely in the further
articulation and development of principles relevant to shared responsibility
that a unitary model is less plausible, as such principles must cater to different types of interests. In this sense, unity may only be tenable at a high level
of abstraction. Second, in some respects, the system of international state responsibility contains tensions that might impede this normative

See Jutta Brunnde, Compliance Control, in MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN
250.
RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 376, 383 (Geir Ulfstein et al. eds., 2007) (discussing how international environmental treaties are not viewed by states and international
organizations as mechanisms to "lay blame for violations").
See Jutta Brunnie, InternationalLegal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law
251.
of State Responsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 21, 24 (2005).
See Kingsbury et al., supra note 32, at 27-28.
252.
We do recognize that some noncompliance procedures, for instance under the Aar253.
hus Convention, do frequently refer to principles of responsibility. See CASE LAW OF THE
AARHUS CONVENTION COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE (2004-2008), at 57-65 (Andriy Andrusevych et al. eds., 2008).
Ulf Linderfalk, State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminolo254.
gy-The Role of Language for an Understanding of the International Legal System, 78
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 53, 72 (2009).
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development, mostly related to the role of the injured state,2 55 which thus reduces the potential flexibility of the modes of reparation.2 56
In sum, both in its private and public law dimensions, the law of responsibility is in need of further development, but it is unlikely that this can be
achieved within a unitary set of principles. Different problems call for different solutions.
B. Reconsidering the DistinctionBetween Primary
and Secondary Norms

We argue that, in examining any particular instance where responsibility
needs to be determined in relation to multiple actors that have contributed to
a harmful outcome, it will often be necessary to assess primary and secondary rules in their mutual connection. After highlighting the difficult
application of the dichotomy reflected in the ILC Articles, this Section will
illustrate the shaky conceptual foundations and confusion created by it before suggesting how to depart from it.
1. The Use of the Dichotomy by the ILC
The rules relating to international responsibility are considered to be
secondary (as opposed to the primary) rules of international law, which provide for the content of the obligations of states and international
organizations. This distinction is fundamental to the work of the ILC, illustrated by the fact that it appears at the very beginning of the commentary to
the ASR:
The emphasis is on the secondary rules of State Responsibility: that
is to say the general conditions under international law for the State
to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and
the legal consequences which flow therefrom. The Articles do not
attempt to define the content of the international obligations, the
breach of which gives rise to responsibility. This is the function of
primary rules, whose codification would involve restating most of
the substantive customary and conventional international law. 57
Despite this clear description of the distinction between primary and secondary rules, a reading of the ASR and the ARIO highlights the difficulty in
distinguishing between the two. Indeed, it seems difficult to affirm that the Articles deal only with secondary norms. For example, according to Article 16,
255.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 42.
256.
Article 48 of the ASR provides a theoretical remedy for this shortcoming, but its
full conceptual and practical aspects are yet to be explored. See id. 176, art. 48; see also
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A General Stocktaking of the Connections Between the Multilateral Dimension of Obligations and Codyication of the Law of Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L.
1053, 1053 (2002); Andrea Gattini, A Return Ticket to 'Communitarisme', Please, 13 EUR. J.

INT'L L. 1181, 1181 (2002) (describing the difficulties faced in applying Article 48).
257.
ASR, supra note 17,177, cmt. 1.
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aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act is
clearly conceived of as giving rise to a distinct obligation from the underlying substantive obligation breached by the wrongful act. The commentary to
this article explicitly states that the complicit state is not held responsible for
the international wrongful act of the main perpetrator but for the act of aiding and abetting itself. 25 8 In this sense, Article 16 is a primary rule rather
than a secondary one.25 9
More generally, it is difficult to categorize the subject matter of Part II
of the Articles, relating to the content of a state's international responsibility.
Whereas it is true that these relate to consequences of wrongful acts, and
therefore can be considered secondary norms, they also provide for obligations (cessation and nonrepetition 260 and reparation 261) that can be breached
and as such be subjected to secondary norms, rendering them primary norms
to a certain extent. 262
The inherent duality of Part II demonstrates that if the primary-secondary
dichotomy had been strictly followed as a conceptual matter (rather than
pragmatically, as discussed below), Part II could never have existed at all. Instead, the existence of obligations to repair, or at the very least the scope and
extent of those obligations, would have been left to the content of each individual primary obligation in the same way that the requirements for fault or
damage are left to primary obligations.
To be clear, this would certainly be impractical and is not the solution
we advocate. However, it does illustrate the difficulty of identifying what actually constitutes a primary or a secondary rule beyond the pragmatic
considerations of efficiency. Following this same logic, one could even argue that the rules of attribution could very well have been considered to be
primary obligations in the same way as fault or damage. The same holds
true of circumstances precluding wrongfulness, to the extent that they affect
the initial violation itself.2 63
2. The Conceptual Limits and Confusion of the Dichotomy
The above examples highlight the difficulty in establishing what aspects
of responsibility should be left entirely to primary rules (fault, damage) and
what should not (attribution, reparation). The ILC seems to refer to a Hartian model, whereby the primary rules are the strict rules of conduct and all

258.
259.

Id. 77, art. 16, cmt. 10.
See Graefrath, supra note 196, at 372 (noting the distinct impression that certain

articles are "primary").

260.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 30.
261.
Id. 76, art. 31.
Third Crawford Report, supra note 227, 17 (noting the "internal application" and
262.
the "reflexive nature" of the draft Articles on State Responsibility).
263.
Eric David, Primary and Secondary Rules, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 127, at 27, 29.
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the rules of responsibility should be considered as secondary rules of adju-

dication. 264
However, it appears that the dichotomy between primary and secondary
rules was adopted for essentially pragmatic reasons rather than conceptual
ones. This is confirmed by the drafting process and discussions held within
the ILC. 2 65 The dichotomy allowed the ILC to circumscribe its work, which
had reached an impasse-most notably on the question of injuries to aliens
and their property-by excluding from its purview the question of the
sources and contents of the obligations and focusing only on the
determination of the breach of an obligation and the consequences of such a
breach. 266 Crawford confirms the fundamentally pragmatic approach
adopted and the rejection of any conceptual objective: "the distinction
between primary obligations and secondary rules of responsibility is to
some extent a functional one, related to the development of international law
rather than to any logical necessity."267 He adds that since the ILC was not
engaged in posterior analytics, "this does not seem to be much of a
criticism." 268 The positive consequence of such an approach by the ILC must
be recognized because it enabled the ILC to move forward and ultimately
conclude its work on the ASR (and later on the ARIO).
However, the conceptual relevance of this dichotomy can be questioned.
It appears that the dichotomy was not meant to be conceptual at all, apart
from its functional character, but rather masked an entirely different
criterion for inclusion in the ILC Articles: that of generality. "What defines
the scope of the articles is not their 'secondary' status but their generality:
the articles represent those areas where the ILC could identify and reach
consensus on general propositions that can be applied more or less
comprehensively across the entire range of international law."26 9 Crawford
noted, "[T]o some extent the classification of a rule of responsibility as
secondary or not is linked to the issue of its generality. The articles are
aimed at specifying certain general rules concerning the existence or
consequences of the breach of an international obligation."27 0
As previously stated, the ILC's pragmatism is certainly laudable as allowing the ILC to finish its work on the Articles. It does however raise a
question: Why "burden" the theoretical debate on responsibility with the

264.
See Jean d'Aspremont, Hart et le positivisme postmoderne en droit international,
113 REVUE GENtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 635, 636-37 (2009).
265.
See David, supra note 263, at 27-28.
266.
See id. at 28-29.
267.
James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 874, 879 (2002).
268.
Id. at 879.
269.

Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Introductionand Overview, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.

773, 780-81 (2002).
270.

Crawford, supra note 267, at 879.
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primary-secondary dichotomy? Indeed, it creates a certain amount of unnecessary confusion.
For one, such an approach creates an illusion of a chronological application of the two types of rules, 271 the primary rules being the main source
of obligations and the secondary rules a subsidiary set of principles and
source of obligations. But the process of establishing the responsibility of
states and international organizations is both more complex and more holistic. The operation of attribution implies some consideration of the content of
the obligation, 27 2 just as the drafting of the primary obligation may be influenced by a consideration of the reparation that may apply in case of breach
and, moreover, will affect the requirements of reparation. 27 3 There is an interaction between the two sets of rules that makes the primary-secondary
model confusing, if only semantically.
Second, if we base the distinction between primary and secondary rules
on the generality of the latter category, the exact nature of the notion of lex
specialis becomes somewhat confusing. Indeed, in the context of state responsibility, the rule on lex specialis theoretically provides that where issues
covered by the ASR are governed by "special rules of international law," the
ASR does not apply. 274 However, once established that the ILC labeled what
could have been considered principles of responsibility as primary rules, we
are left with the question what the distinctive nature of lex specialis is. For
example, because the requirement of fault is excluded from the ASR,
agreements between states on this issue constitute "primary rules," whereas
because the ASR considers attribution, agreements on this issue are lex specialis. In other words, this category only applies to those rules of
responsibility that the ILC considered, but not to other relevant rules of responsibility that might have been left out for entirely pragmatic reasons.
Crawford confirmed the relative nature of the distinction when he wrote,
The distinction between primary and secondary obligations was,
and is, somewhat relative. A particular rule of conduct might contain its own special rule of attribution or its own rule about
remedies. In such a case, there would be little point in arguing
about questions of classification. The rule would be applied and it
would normally be treated as a lex specialis, that is, as excluding
the general rule. 275
Noberto Bobbio, Nouvelles rdflexions sur les normes primaires et secondaires, in
271.
LA RhGLE DE DROIT 104, 104-06 (Chaim Perelman ed., 1971).
See, e.g., Jean d'Aspremont, Le tyrannicide en droit international, in THE RIGHT TO
272.

LIFE 287, 312-13 (Christian Tomuschat et al. eds., 2010) (arguing that in cases involving tyrannicide, the applicability of the primary rule-the right to life-may depend on the
secondary rule of attribution).
This is in addition to being affected by the public or private interests protected. See
273.
infra Part IV.D.

274.
275.

See ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 55.
Crawford, supra note 267, at 876-77.
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However practical this may sound, it is intellectually unsatisfactory to treat
pragmatic considerations, while legitimate, as the conceptual foundation of
a category of rules.
3. Shifting Away from the Dichotomy
In light of the conceptual uncertainty underlying the ILC's dichotomy,
as explained in more detail below,276 we argue for a holistic and integrated
approach that looks at both the content of obligations as well as the rules
that were designated by the LLC as rules of responsibility. We must consider
all the rules of responsibility. Notably, specific arrangements (such as treaty
provisions) regarding shared responsibility between states, which were formerly considered to be either primary rules or lex specialis based on their
inclusion in the lLC framework, should instead be considered together.
C. The Responsibility-LiabilityDichotomy

The terms liability and responsibility are often used interchangeably to
address either issues of responsibility strictu sensu or issues of reparations.277 Some treaties use the term liability in a way that seems identical to
responsibility. Article 235 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) provides that "States are responsible for the fulfillment of their
international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the
marine environment. They shall be liable in accordance with international
law."278 The former sentence may be understood as referring to the contents
of primary obligations, whereas the second sentence refers to responsibility
in the same sense used by the ILC.27 9 Article 6 to Annex IX of UNCLOS
provides for joint and several liability of the EU and member states. 280 It
does not appear that liability in this context means anything other than responsibility as used by the LLC. 28 1
However, there is considerable ambiguity in the use of the terms responsibility and liability, both in international and comparative law
276.

See infra Part IV.D.

277.

See, e.g., Noyes & Smith, supra note 12; James Crawford & Jeremy Watkins, Inter-

national Responsibility, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 283, 283-84 (Samantha

Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).
278.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 235(1), openedfor signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
279.
Special Rapporteur on International Liability, Fifth Rep. on InternationalLiability
for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, 1 39, Int'l
Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/383 (1984) (by Robert Quentin-Baxter) [hereinafter Report
on InternationalLiability].

280.

UNCLOS, supra note 278, annex IX, art. 6(2).

281.
Report on InternationalLiability, supra note 279, 1 39; see also Special Rapporteur
on International Liability, Preliminary Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Pmhibited by InternationalLaw, [[ 9-15, Int'l Law Comm'n,

U.N. Doc A/CN.4/334 (1980) (by Robert Quentin-Baxter).
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literature. The decision of the ILC to reserve the term liability for obligations with respect to injury arising from acts not prohibited by international
law 282 and, later, to civil liability 28 3 has made the use of the term liability in
connection with internationally wrongful acts confusing. 284
It appears that many of the cases where the term (joint) liability is used
pertain specifically to the obligation to provide compensation for damage.
That certainly is true of the term's usage in domestic law 285 and in civil liability conventions, 286 as well as in the work of the ILC on allocation of loss
in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities. 287 It is
also true for some treaties dealing with damage caused by states. 28 8 The term
(joint) liability then indicates that in a case where multiple tortfeasors together have caused damage, the plaintiff can collect the entire sum of
compensation from either one of the defendants. This is also how the term is
used in, for instance, the Outer Space Liability Convention 289 and in
UNCLOS 290 as well as in civil liability schemes. 2 9 1

282.

JULIO BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

10 (2011).
Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm
283.
Arising out of Hazardous Activities, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on Its

Fifty-Eighth Session, 61 U.N. GAOR Supp No. 10, at 1, 106, 67, princ. 4, cmt. 26, U.N.
Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter Draft Principles on Transboundary Harm], reprinted in
[2006] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n (forthcoming).
See M.B. Akehurst, InternationalLiabilityfor Injurious Consequences Arising out
284.
ofActs Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 8 (1985); Alan Boyle,
State Responsibility and InternationalLiabilityfor Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (1990);
Karl Zemanek, State Responsibility and Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND IN-

TERNATIONAL LAw 197 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991).

285.
PETL, supra note 109, art. 1:101 ("[A] person to whom damage to another is legally attributed is liable to compensate that damage.").
See, e.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art.
286.
1(2), Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC].
Draft Principles on Transboundary Harm, supra note 283.
287.
See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 278, art. 232 ("States shall be liable for damage or
288.
loss attributableto them." (emphasis added)); id. art. 235(2); Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies art. 7, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
Outer Space Treaty].
289.
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. 4,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
UNCLOS, supra note 278, art. 139.
290.
See, e.g., CLC, supra note 286, art. 4 ("When oil has escaped or has been dis291.
charged from two or more ships, and pollution damage results therefrom, the owners of all the
ships concerned, unless exonerated under Article III, shall be jointly and severally liable for all
such damage which is not reasonably separable."); see also Guidelines for the Development of
Domestic Legislation on Liability, Response Action and Compensation for Damage Caused by
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, U.N. Env't Programme Decision SS.XI/5 B, Annex,
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We acknowledge that using the term liability to refer to the legal consequences of a wrongful act in terms of reparation can be confusing, if not
misleading. This is not only so because some languages do not have an
equivalent for the term responsibility and thus can only use the term liability
(or its equivalent), 292 but also because it is precisely these consequences that
form the very contents of international responsibility. Moreover, construing
a freestanding concept of responsibility disconnected from its legal consequences is problematic and in fact may shield states and international
organizations from such consequences.2 93
Nonetheless, from the perspective of analyzing shared responsibility, a
twofold qualification of the common equation of responsibility and liability
is called for. First, in line with our earlier distinction between public and
private law dimensions of international responsibility, we need to recognize
that determination of responsibility, on the one hand, and determination of
the legal consequences of such responsibility in terms of compensation to
injured parties, on the other, raise different questions, in particular in regard
to the apportionment of damages. To say that two or more states or international organizations are jointly responsible for a particular wrongful act does
not necessarily mean that these states or international organizations will be
obliged to pay full compensation for the injury (as is often implied by the
concept of joint liability). As we will further explain below, the operation of
principles of shared responsibility may differ between determinations of responsibility and determinations of reparation.
Second, we must recognize the different ways in which liability, in the
sense of an obligation to provide reparation, can come into existence. This
holds first and foremost for liability for acts that are not (necessarily) internationally wrongful: for example, the principle of joint liability under the
Outer Space Treaty is not contingent on a finding of wrongfulness.2 94 Following from that, and pushing this logic further, we would argue that the
term liability can be applied methodologically to all situations where obligations to compensate arise, irrespective of whether the wrongfulness of the
11th Sess., Feb. 24-26, 2010, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 25, U.N. Doc. A/65/25, at
18, guideline 7 (Feb. 26, 2010).
292.
Crawford & Watkins, supra note 277, at 283.
293.

See Phillip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of InternationalLaw, 29

HARV. INT'L L.J.

294.

1,3 (1988).
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 288. Article 7 provides:

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object
into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party
from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by
such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies.
Id. art. 7. Liability is then only based on damage, irrespective of wrongfulness. See MANFRED
LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 124

(2010).
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act or the responsibility of the compensating entity has been considered.
This expansion allows for a more comprehensive discussion of reparation
for injury in international law because it covers not only formal judicial decisions that establish the responsibility of an entity and the corresponding
obligations of reparation, but also any agreement that provides for reparation irrespective of responsibility (strict liability), decisions of quasi-judicial
or political bodies (reparation commissions, for example), and even unilateral acceptance of obligations to provide reparation.
D. A New Approach to InternationalResponsibility: From a
Unitary Regime to a DifferentiatedApproach

On the basis of the above discussions, we argue that we must move
away from a unitary approach toward a differentiated approach to
responsibility that reflects the differences between norms and their breaches
295
as well as the various objectives of international responsibility. Such a
differentiated approach will allow us to consider both the principles of the
general regime of responsibility and possible derogations (that would in
particular, but not exclusively, be contained in treaties 296) that would modify
the application of the general regime.297
1. A Differentiated Approach
Three preliminary points should be made regarding our use of the notion of differentiation. First, it rests largely on the distinction between public
and private law models, but we do acknowledge that the distinction is not
watertight. These models should be considered as a continuum rather than a
rigid dichotomy. To do otherwise would be to somewhat open ourselves to
the compelling critique of the private-public dichotomy in international
law.2 98 Nonetheless, we submit that it is useful and possible to identify distinctions between public and private law dimensions of responsibility that
can be captured by our "differentiated approach."
Second, while we refer here to differentiation primarily in terms of
principles of responsibility, such principles are mostly embedded in and interrelated with institutional structures. These institutional structures also
mirror the differences between private and public dimensions. The nature
295.

See supra Part IV.A.

It is also conceivable that such principles emerge by particular custom, at the
296.
regional level for example. See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Leges Speciales and SelfContainedRegimes, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 127, at 139,

139-40.
At this stage, we do not take a position on the order in which these need to be ex297.
amined. The order in which principles should be considered will depend, among other things,
on the approach to the international legal order from the angle of unity or the angle of fragmentation. Id. at 146-47.
See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/PrivateDimension, 10 EUR. J.
298.
INT'L L. 387, 387-95 (1999).
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and institutional structure of noncompliance mechanisms in international
environmental law is a good example; they have more in common with public law administrative procedures for reviewing the exercise of public
authority than with private law procedures for determining compensation for

damage. 299

Third, the differentiation that we advance does not correspond to fields
of international law such as human rights, law of the sea, refugee law, or
environmental law, in the sense that each such field has its own set of
principles. Of course, we acknowledge that these fields have sometimes
developed (semi-)autonomously with specific rules of responsibility and
discrete mechanisms of implementation. However, conceptually, our
approach aims at transcending these apparently separate areas of law and
looking at the possible common interests that they might aim to protect.
With this caveat in mind, we will first identify sources of differentiation
(the nature of the norm and the nature of the breach) and then discuss legal
requirements for establishing responsibility.
a. Sources of Differentiation
A central proposition of our approach is that the nature of the obligation
may determine the nature of corresponding responsibility. The nature of the
obligation can be approached from two angles: the hierarchy of norms and
the subjects of norms. For one, the increased hierarchy in the international
legal order affects the nature of responsibility. The paradigmatic example is
the development of jus cogens norms, which has triggered a more general
discussion about a possible hierarchy of norms. Some argue that a series of
"constitutional" principles 300 such as certain human rights obligations, are
placed at the top of the hierarchy. 30 1 It is conceivable that an obligation
could be qualified as having per se a public or a private objective, triggering
the application of particular principles of responsibility that serve to ensure
the protection of that objective. This would apply to norms that do not directly focus on the effect or injury to a particular state but rather serve
communitarian objectives, such as the prohibition on polluting the high

seas. 302

In terms of the subjects of international obligations, obligations vary
from being bilateral to multilateral to erga omnes, placing them at different
points along the public-private spectrum. For example, obligations contained in a bilateral trade agreement will not necessarily bring into play the
299.

See Tanzi & Pitea, supra note 31, at 578.

300.
JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I2, 26 (2009); Stefan Kadelbach & Thomas Kleinlein, InternationalLaw: A Constitutionfor
Mankind?: An Attempt at a Re-appraisalwith an Analysis of Constitutional Principles, 50
GER.

Y.B.

INT'L L.

303, 305 (2007).

301.
Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights and "Jus Cogens": A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 741, 741 (2003).

302.

UNCLOS, supra note 278, art. 232.
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same principles of responsibility and the same consequences in terms of
shared responsibility as a multilateral treaty on the conservation of fish
stocks. We thus must recognize the possibility of classifying obligations according to their subjects and how this might affect the shared responsibility

for their breach.3 03
However, the nature and subject of the obligation will not always
indicate the nature of the relevant principles of responsibility. Often, it will
be the interest protected by the obligation (or the treaty in which it is
contained) itself that will trigger particular principles and procedures of
responsibility. This resembles the way the law of responsibility is applied in
many domestic legal systems where different regimes (such as tort, criminal,
contract, and administrative law), and their respective sets of rules in terms
of procedure and invocation, may each apply to the same violation as
considered below. 30 Such a framework will allow us to imagine different
rules for different situations without having necessarily to choose between
them in an institutional void, as the unitary approach to international
responsibility would impose on us.
b. Differentiated Requirements for Establishing Responsibility
In terms of requirements for determining responsibility, two examples
can be given: the question of fault and the role of injury. We note however
that the above considerations can also affect other possible conditions for
the establishment of responsibility or allocation of loss, such as causation,
effective control, or geographical proximity.
First of all, it is conceivable that the nature of the conduct that triggers
responsibility will be different depending on the protected interest, thus allowing for a gradation between fault and objective responsibility. In contrast
to ordinary situations of responsibility, in cases of aggravated responsibility
associated with the public dimensions of responsibility fault will invariably
be a component of the principles of responsibility.305
However, the relationship between the nature of the interests and the requirement of fault is not straightforward and may depend on the foundations
of and justifications for responsibility. For example, a utilitarian approach
Incidentally, this will also challenge the idea that the source of the obligation is ir303.
relevant for international law. Indeed, the violation of a treaty obligation of a bilateral nature
could lead to different consequences than the violation of a customary norm of jus cogens. In
the same way, the relationship between erga omnes partes treaty obligations and erga omnes
customary obligations, even if they can overlap in cases of nearly universal ratification of a
given treaty, will need to be explored in light of the public or private nature of the interest being protected. For a discussion of the different "types" of erga omnes obligations, see infra
Part IV.D.l.c.
See supra Part III.B.
304.
See, e.g., Gaetnao Arangio-Ruiz, State Fault and the Forms and Degrees of Interna305.
tional Responsibility: Questions of Attribution and Relevance, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU DgVELOPPEMENT 25, 25-26 (M6langes Michel

Virally ed., 1991).
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could justify a system in which the more crucial the interest and the greater
the consequence of a breach (in the case of nuclear activities, for example),
the less role fault should play in determining responsibility.3 0 6 On the other
hand, a more Kantian approach, which relies on moral autonomy, would
suggest that moral blame should only rest on the state that had an intent to
commit the breach so as not to attach the stigma of responsibility too widely. 3 11 Such an approach would also suggest that, should the intent be
established, stronger consequences be attached to the breach in terms of
reparations.308
The second example is that of injury. As discussed previously, injury
has been removed from the requirements of establishing responsibility. 309
However, distinctions may need to be made in this respect. We take the
position that the removal of injury, and more generally of outcome, as a
constitutive element of responsibility, is conceptually problematic; a concept
of responsibility expressly based on injury would have been conceptually
preferable.3 10 Nonetheless, it may be necessary to differentiate between
different roles of the concept of injury. The concept plays a cardinal role in a
case of breach of a bilateral treaty obligation, which is therefore of a private
(contract) law nature and causes injury to the other party. Injury suffered by
the direct beneficiary of the obligation is then the measure of responsibility
and reparation. On the other hand, in more public law-oriented situations,
the interest protected by the existence of the norm requires that neither
responsibility nor reparation is made contingent on a specific injury, thus
reducing the importance of injury as a component of responsibility, even if it
might be taken into account in the reparations phase.31
c. Differentiated Conditions for Invocation
The acknowledged differences between the public and private law models require a reexamination of the conditions necessary for the invocation of
state responsibility under international law. Indeed, it is possible to deter-

306.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 192, at 38.
307.
On the Kantian principle of autonomy, see generally KANT ON MORAL AUTONOMY
(Oliver Sensen ed., forthcoming 2013). For its relation with attribution of moral blame, see
Mordechai Kremnitzer & Tatjana Homle, Human Dignity and the Principleof Culpability, 44

ISR. L. REV. 115, 122 (2011) (explaining that, under the principle of culpability, punishment
should be dependent on the moral culpability of the individual rather than on consequentialist
considerations). For a specific application of this concept in international law, see Darryl Robinson, How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated: A Culpability Contradiction, Its
Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution, 13 MELB. J. INT'L L. 1 (2012) (arguing, in part, that the
culpability principle requires that only individuals who have actually contributed to a crime be
punished for it under international criminal law).
308.
For a discussion of the implications on shared responsibility, see supra PartIII.
309.

See supra Part I.B.

310.
311.

Stem, supra note 21, at 93.
For a discussion of the implications on shared responsibility, see infra Part V.
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mine which states can and should have locus standi based on the applicable
principles of responsibility and in light of the public-private dichotomy.
The LC recognized that on this point distinctions needed to be made,
and indeed this issue illustrates perfectly that the unitary model of the law of
international responsibility is not tenable. On the question of locus standi,
ASR Article 42 allows either the individual state to which the obligation is
owed individually-or any states that might be specially affected by the
violation of an obligation owed to a group of states or the international
3 12
community as a whole-to raise a claim against the transgressing state(s).
This invocation mechanism fits the private law model of international
responsibility by requiring the state bringing the claim to demonstrate its
specific interest in the performance of the obligation. ASR Article 48, on the
other hand, functions very differently.313 It does not require that the invoking
state be injured to raise the claim where the obligation protects a collective
interest of a group of stateS314 or of the international community as a
whole.315 This is clearly a public law approach, such that a state invoking
responsibility under Article 48 is clearly acting on behalf of the community
31 6
(either of some states or all states) to protect a community interest.
This analysis highlights the ambiguity in the expression of an obligation
"owed to the international community as a whole," or an erga omnes obligation. There exist in fact two types of erga omnes obligations, depending on
the interest protected by the obligation and the legal regime of responsibility
applied. For example, in some national legal systems, the obligation not to
cause damage may be owed to everyone, but a claim of legal responsibility
generally only arises from a specific injury to an individual who alone possesses the locus standi for that claim. On the other hand, the obligation not to
kill under criminal law is also owed to everyone, but the violation of that obligation and the ensuing injury to an individual does not necessarily give that
3 17
individual standing; rather, the locus standi resides with a public authority.
ASR, supra note 17, [76, art. 42(1)(a) (individual state); id. 176, art. 42(l)(b) (any
312.
affected states).
Article 48(1) provides:
313.
Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to
a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the obligation breached is owed to the
international community as a whole.
Id. 76, art. 48(1).
Id. 76, art.47(l)(a).
314.
Id. 76, art. 47(l)(b).
315.
For an overview of the historical evolution toward the taking into account of com316.
munity interests in the law of state responsibility, see VILLALPANDO, supra note 49; Nolte,
supra note 49.

This is a general model. A number of national systems provide for privately trig317.
gered public prosecutions, but they all involve to a large extent public authorities exercising
some form of discretion in the opportunity of pursuing the investigation or prosecution.
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This applies mutatis mutandis to international law. For example, the obligation to respect diplomatic immunity is in the abstract owed to all states, and
in this sense is erga omnes; but should it be breached, it is only the injured
state that will be able to bring a claim. 3 18 On the other hand, the obligation
not to commit genocide is not simply erga omnes in the abstract; rather, its
breach will grant locus standi not only to the injured state, but also to any
other state acting on behalf of the international community.3 19
This duality in the concept of erga omnes is better captured by a differentiated rather than a unitary approach to international responsibility. The
dissociation of public and private dimensions leads to results that better address the different objectives of international responsibility. The injured
state under Article 42 and the noninjured state acting essentially as a public
prosecutor under Article 48 cannot be subject to the same requirements given the different rationale of the interests protected. The ILC, while
recognizing the different aims and foundations of the two models of invocation, has not reasoned the point to its logical conclusion. As a result, in
developing the technical requirements of invocation, it remained trapped in
the ideal of unity. In particular, one can question whether all requirements of
Article 48 fit the public law dimension of that article. For example, should a
state falling under that article be subject to Article 45 (on the loss of the
right to invoke responsibility)?3 20
The manifestations of invocation in its public and private law dimensions have notable, if sometimes indirect, relations to shared responsibility.
In particular, they allow for differentiating the possible types of reparations
available to different claimants in relation to the nature of the responsibility.
Recovery of certain types of reparations might not be possible against some
responsible contributing states depending not only on the nature of the obligation breached, but also on the role of the claimant.
2. The Relationship Between the General Regime of
Responsibility and Derogations
The second dimension of our proposed model is the relationship between
the general principles of responsibility and principles that constitute derogations, that is, principles that deviate from the general principles. This point is
not a new one-it is a manifestation of the relationship between general laws
and lex specialis."1 ' Treaties often provide for possible derogations (and their

318.
319.

See YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 143 (2004).

See Robert Kolb & Sandra Kriihenmann, The Scope Ratione Personae of the Com-

pulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 429

(Paola Gaeta ed., 2009).
320.
See ASR, supra note 17,
98.

76, art. 48(3); see also Gattini, supra note 256, at 1197-

321.
See Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The
Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 27, 37 (2005); Erich Vranes, Lex Superior,
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limits). 322 Within the law of state responsibility, the issue is equally present. The ASR enshrines the principle of lex specialis derogat legi generali
in Article 55, according to which the Articles do not apply if the issues of
3 23
responsibility "are governed by special rules of international law."
The relationship between the general regime of responsibility and derogations will likewise be affected by the public or private nature of the
interest protected by both the obligation and the applicable principles of responsibility. In relation to primary norms, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides an example by stating that a treaty cannot derogate
from a jus cogens norm. 324 The Commentary to Article 55 of the ASR echoes this example by suggesting that "States cannot, even as between
themselves, provide for legal consequences of a breach of their mutual obligations which would authorize acts contrary to peremptory norms of general
international law."3 25 Although the commentary of Article 55 may suggest a
single solution to a given situation, we argue that the same set of facts might
give rise to different answers under different legal regimes. While, following
a private law logic, it is conceivable that states could exclude their responsibility for damage or limit their reparation obligations between themselves,
that will not be possible in the public law dimension of responsibility. This
is once again similar to the national context. Indeed, while two parties can
exclude or limit the scope of damages paid in case of breach of contract, for
example, or even of civil reparations for injury to persons or property, these
two parties cannot contract out their criminal responsibility.
In sum, we argue that we must recognize that different principles of responsibility may apply in such areas as military operations, refugee law, and
environmental law. Each of these areas has its own set of primary obligations relevant to questions of shared responsibility as well as its own private
and public law dimensions; a differentiated approach to shared responsibility seems inevitable.

V. PRINCIPLES

AND PROCESSES OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

In light of our critique of the unitary nature of international responsibility and its reliance on the strict separation between primary and secondary
Lex Specialis, Lex Posterior-Zur Rechtsnaturder "Konfliktlosungsregeln," 65 HEIDELBERG
J. INT'L L. 391 (2005).

See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz322.
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal art. 11, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (providing that any
special agreement should not "derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and other wastes as required by this Convention").
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 55; see also Axel Marschik, Too Much Order? The
323.
Impact of Special Secondary Norms on the Unity and Efficacy of the InternationalLegal System, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 212 (1998). For a recent series of articles discussing, among other

things, the human rights systems, the World Trade Organization, and the EU, see THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 127.

324.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

325.

ASR, supra note 17, 1 77, art. 55, cmt. 2.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

422

[Vol. 34:359

rules,3 26 we will now revisit the principles that can be applied to situations
of shared responsibility. As we identified above, the prevailing system of international responsibility suffers from a lack of clarity as to whether and
when responsibility can in fact be shared or what consequences would arise
from sharing it; this is particularly due to the contested nature of double attribution, the failure to articulate a normative basis for attributing
responsibility (rather than conduct), and the absence of principles to apportion responsibility and reparation when principles of causation are
insufficient.3 27 We thus focus on what is perhaps the quintessential question
for shared responsibility: how to determine who is responsible for what.
In order to tie together the fundamental developments sketched in Part
II, the deficiencies in the current regime of international responsibility
sketched in Part III, and the differentiated approach proposed in Part IV, we
must now reconsider how identified principles and processes of shared responsibility can apply to the variety of situations in which multiple actors
contribute to proscribed outcomes. We first examine the principle of joint
(and several) responsibility as a possible solution to situations of multiple
wrongdoing actors. We then focus respectively on the substantive aspects of
allocation of responsibility among multiple wrongdoing states or between
transgressing and injured states and the procedural aspects that will arise in
(quasi-)judicial proceedings.
A. Joint (and Several) Responsibility

In domestic legal systems, situations where multiple actors contribute to
a single injury can often be addressed in tort law by resort to the principle of
joint and several liability.3 28What is meant by this expression is that the victim can recover the full amount of reparations from one of the responsible
actors, which can in turn require compensation from the other responsible
actors that may have contributed to the damage.32 9
Several scholars have advocated the application of this principle in international law. 3 0 The principle is contained in some treaties"' and has been
considered in some case law. For example, the Seabed Chamber affirmed the
applicability of this principle under UNCLOS, writing, "Joint and several

326.
See supra Part IV.A-B.
327.
See supra text accompanying notes 131-136.
328.
Note that the PETL adopted a different terminology. The drafters of this project believed that the expression "joint and several" might be misleading because "it may suggest
that the tortfeasers have to be sued together and secondly because of the association with
'joint tortfeasors' who form only a part of those exposed to 'joint and several liability.'" W.V.
Horton Rogers, Comparative Report on Multiple Tortfeasors, in UNIFICATION

OF TORT LAW:

271, 272 (W.V.H. Rogers ed., 2004). They therefore found the expression of "solidary liability" more appropriate. Id. at 278.
329.
See PETL, supra note 109, art. 9:101(3).
330.
See, e.g., Chinkin, supra note 6, at 181-83; Noyes & Smith, supra note 12, at 259.
331.
See supra Part IV.D.
MULTIPLE TORTFEASORs
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liability arises where different entities have contributed to the same damage
so that full reparation can be claimed from all or any of them."3 32
However, application of the principle as a solution to situations of multiple contributions to a single harmful outcome encounters two possible
problems. First, the concept of joint responsibility, being initially based on a
private law model, may need to be adapted to public law contexts. While
joint responsibility may function in some multilateral situations in a way
that resembles its domestic tort law origins (for instance, when two upstream riparian states cause damage to a downstream state), it is harder to
transpose the principle to cases that more resemble a public law- or administrative law-type setting. In particular, whereas joint and several
responsibility can be helpful as a means of providing relief to injured parties, it is much less relevant when the aim is not reparation but the return to
legality of all responsible actors. This is directly related to the different nature and role of injury in such situations. 33 3 This does not mean, however,
that concepts of joint responsibility from public-order fields, such as international criminal law, might not be relevant for the identification of the
principles of shared responsibility. 334
Second, the decentralized nature of the international legal order, combined with the lack of courts with compulsory jurisdiction, suggests that the
international legal order is much less conducive to the application of joint
and several responsibility. For one thing, the principle implies that one actor
may be held responsible and forced to provide reparation for injury caused
jointly with another actor. As indicated above, this is in tension with the
fundamental principle of sovereignty in international law. This problem
could be resolved if a coresponsible actor could require the other responsible actors to provide their share of compensation for the injury. Indeed, the
principle, in its domestic application, assumes that one responsible person
who has compensated a victim can subsequently bring a claim against other
responsible parties. But when no court is available for such claims, that possibility remains merely theoretical, casting doubt on the principle's
relevance in international law. The difficulty of transposing the principle as
such to the international legal order leads us to reflect further on the substantive and procedural aspects of allocation of responsibility in situations
of multiparty responsibility.
B. Substantive Aspects

As regards the substantive aspects of shared responsibility, two sets of
questions have to be considered: the first relating to the relationship between
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
332.
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS
Rep. 10, 201, available at http://www.itios.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no_
17/adv-op_010211 .pdf.
See supra text accompanying notes 222-232.
333.
334.

See infra Part V.B.
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the tortfeasors and the victim, and the second relating to the relationship
among the tortfeasors. These two aspects will be discussed separately in
Parts V.B.1 and V.B.2.
1. The Relationship Between the Injured State and
the Responsible States
A core question in situations of shared responsibility is that of determining against which state(s) a claim can be brought. Here we need to
distinguish between the normative foundations of identifying the subjects of
claims and the question what can be claimed.
a. The Subject of Claims
We suggest that on this point a distinction be made between situations
of cooperative and cumulative responsibility, which respectively involve
concerted and independent acts.33 5 in situations of concerted action the traditional response, as stated previously, would be for responsibility to flow
from the individual attribution of the act.336 The question then is whether
there is a basis for holding states, or international organizations, responsible
not on the basis of their own act, but on their involvement, or participation,
in the wrongful act of another state. As indicated earlier, both the ASR and
the ARIO have recognized this possibility to a limited extent, notably
through the constructions of aid and assistance and attribution of responsibility. 337 But the constructions recognized in these articles do not exhaust the
range of possibilities for addressing cooperative responsibility.
We identify three possible foundations for shared responsibility in such
situations: consent, control, and the nature of the obligations at issue.
First, one possible avenue is to consider that, under certain conditions,
participation would in and of itself be a criterion for the ability to raise a
claim against a state, even if by applying the ILC principles, the conduct
that led to the wrongful act is attributable to another state. 338 This approach
could imply either a broadening of grounds for attribution of conduct or a
shift from the attribution of conduct to an attribution of responsibility. 339 As
indicated above, while the LLC did recognize the possibility of such joint responsibility, the normative basis thereof remains unclear. One possible basis
that has not found its way into the ILC texts is a form of implied consent to
the consequences of participation in a joint enterprise.
335.

See supra Part I.C.

336.

See supra Part I.C.

337.
ARIO, supra note 18, arts. 14-17; ASR, supra note 17, 76, arts. 16-18.
338.
One way of making this work under the ILC articles would be to apply ASR Article
11, which concerns "conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own." ASR, supra
note 17, 176, art. 11. Participation in a common enterprise would involve implied consent to
adopting the conduct theoretically attributable to another state.
339.
This would be in line with the approach advocated in terms of moral philosophy by
Larry May. See MAY, supra note 24, at 112.
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Arguably, the grounds for moving international responsibility toward
such a consent model of attribution are stronger in a situation where the
public-order dimensions of responsibilities are more prevalent. One can find
some inspiration in the use of concepts of joint enterprise as developed in
other fields of international law, such as international criminal law.3 40 Indeed, from its emergence after the Second World War, international criminal
law has grappled with the difficulty of moving beyond individual responsibility to encompass the collective dimensions of some crimes. While the
theory of conspiracy was used in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,3 4 1 the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
developed the notion of joint criminal enterprise. 342 This concept has given
rise to strong criticism, 3 43 and the transposition of its conditions (most notably its subjective, or mens rea, elements) to the sphere of responsibility of
states or international organizations is not without difficulty. Nonetheless,
for the purposes of rethinking shared responsibility in international law, it is
relevant to analyze how the case law conceptualizes and implements a mode
of participation that goes beyond direct commission by a single actor.
This approach would also be consistent with the fact that in the ASR
and the ARIO the obligation not to provide assistance (one form of participation) is more stringent in the case of serious breaches of peremptory
norms than in the case of breaches of other international obligations. 3 "
In contrast, in situations of cumulative responsibility, where states or international organizations act independently and where there is no concerted
action, it seems difficult to adopt a principle of consent-based attribution to
render an actor responsible for another's conduct. In such situations, the traditional model of attribution is more adequate and allows for the
development of principles of parallel attribution based on independent acts,
with the principle contained in Article 47 of the ASR (that is, where several
states are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each state may be invoked in relation to that act) as a starting
point.

340.

See Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Judicial Creativity and Joint CriminalEnterprise, in
184 (Shane Darcy & Jo-

JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

seph Powderly eds., 2010).
341.
See Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg Forty Years After: An Introduction, 18 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 261, 261 (1986); Frank Mignone, After Nuremberg, Tokyo, 25 IT7x. L. REV.

475, 487 (1947).
342.
Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine of Joint CriminalEnterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 109, 110 (2007); Jens David Ohlin,
Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise,5 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 69, 70 (2007); Harmen van der Wilt, Joint CriminalEnterprise: Possibilitiesand Limitations, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 91, 92 (2007).

343.
at 91.
344.

Cassese, supra note 342, at 114; Ohlin, supra note 342, at 69; Wilt, supra note 342,
ASR, supra note 17,

76, art. 41.
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A second possible basis for shared responsibility is not consent, but
control.3 45 While the control exercised by one actor need not be of such a nature that it results in attribution of the conduct itself, it may contribute to the
eventual wrong (and injury).3 46 Since the contribution of the controlling state
and of the acting state may not easily be apportioned, joint responsibility
may be a proper response.
This construction, which obviously applies only in cases of cooperative
responsibility and not in situations of cumulative responsibility, indeed is a
conceptual foundation for attribution of responsibility in the ARIO,3 47
though not recognized as such in the text. While in the scenario envisaged
by the ARIO, in which responsibility must be attributed to both an organization and its member states, the wrongfulness of the acts by member states is
a given-it is after all the member state to whom an act must be attributedthe organization would be responsible if the member states, under the rules
of the organization, had to carry out an act that would be wrongful according to their international obligations. That act could only be withdrawn or
changed by the organization, not by the member states.
This scenario fits more closely with the public, rather than private, law
perspective. This is so because the fundamental question addressed by private
law is on what basis a state or organization would be responsible vis-a-vis a
third state. This is yet another manifestation of the fact that a system of joint
responsibility requires differentiation between public and private law dimensions.
Third, it may be argued that the nature of some obligations themselves
affects the allocation of responsibility, especially if some obligations can be
ex ante qualified as "shared" obligations. If a state commits genocide in another state, and other states may have been in a position to take action to
prevent this genocide, the question arises against whom the victim state may
bring a claim for the failure to protect it.
One way of resolving this issue is to devise a series of allocation principles to identify the state or states that bear the greatest duty to respond to
such a situation. This seems to have been the approach adopted in the Genocide case, where the ICJ referred to a number of criteria that could be taken
into account to determine in concreto the scope of a state's duty to prevent
genocide.3 48 Such criteria included "means reasonably available," "the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or

345.
The term control is used here in a loose sense. It should not be equated with "effective control." See ARIO, supra note 18, art. 7.
346.
Thus, we have to distinguish between effective control as a basis for attribution of
conduct (for example, under Article 8 ASR and Article 7 ARIO) and control as a basis for attribution of responsibility (for example, under Article 15 ARIO). Note that the distinction is
not always sharp. See Reinisch, supra note 154, at 63.
347.
ARIO, supra note 18, art. 17.
348.
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 1430 (Feb. 26).
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already committing, genocide," and the "geographical distance of the State
concerned from the scene of the events." 34 9
However, this approach, while certainly having some practical justifications, may not in fact encapsulate the conceptual foundations of such
collective obligations. Indeed, this obligation is more than just another obligation. It represents the recognition of a form of primitive social contract at
the international level, whereby the international community as a reified entity owes a sort of sovereign duty to protect its subjects in the same way that
a state must protect its citizens against crime.35 o In this sense, the duty is truly a shared one: it is owed by the international community as a whole and,
by implication (as the international community is not an entity as such), by
all states constituting that community, irrespective of their special relationship to the injured state.
In this context we therefore also have to consider the role of the United
Nations as the most advanced, if imperfect, embodiment of the international
community. To the extent that a breach of these obligations falls within the
scope of a threat to or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression under
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the United Nations has the responsibility and
arguably a duty to repair the consequences of the violation. Such
responsibility then coexists with the obligations of member states, which
arguably can be held responsible for failure to allow the United Nations to
act. This approach is related to the emerging literature on the possible
obligation of the U.N. Security Council to act in R2P situations.35 1
Quite obviously, such a collective duty to act through the United Nations is not recognized in positive international law.35 2 It would also ignore
the essential differences between the relevant actors within the United Nations in terms of their respective powers and capacities.353 The alternative of
directing claims against the members of the international community requires a fundamental consideration of the relevant factors that could
differentiate states' respective responsibility, which goes much beyond the
35 4
rather superficial approach advanced in the Genocide case.

349.

Id.

350.

See THOMAS HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 335-53 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books

1984) (1651).
See, e.g., Anne Peters, The Responsibility to Protect and the PermanentFive: The
351.
Obligation to Give Reasons for a Veto, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 5, at 199,

199.
See id. (stating that discussing the obligations are a "thought experiment, because
352.
the binding legal force of [R2P] is not settled").
As such, there is indeed merit in construing this situation in terms of shared rather
353.
than collective responsibility. See MAY, supra note 24, at 37-38; see also supra Part I.B.
For examples of more comprehensive approaches to differentiating states' respec354.
tive responsibility, see Miller, supra note 20; Pattison, supra note 5.
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b. What Can Be Claimed
The above foundations (consent, control, and nature of the obligation)
are independent of (if related to) the extent of the claim of the injured party
once the principle of responsibility has been established. What can an injured party claim against a specific state or organization? As indicated
above, the idea behind joint responsibility is that an injured party can claim
the whole damage award against a state or organization, even if that state or
organization is only one of a multiplicity of responsible actors. An alternative is that of proportionate liability, when a claim can only be brought for
the damage attributable to a given state.
The first option could seem like a natural consequence when responsibility is based on consensual participation in a common endeavor. However,
as indicated above, joint responsibility functions better in a private law paradigm rather than a public law paradigm where return to legality by all
responsible actors is essential and where, moreover, the symbolic acknowledgment of responsibility could be seen as sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the sanctity of the international legal order.355
However, fundamental considerations of fairness may oppose holding
one party responsible for the entire injury, in particular when the concerted
nature of the collective action is weak.3 16 Moreover, doing so would be difficult to justify since there is little if any basis for responsible parties to
invoke the coresponsibility of those that contributed to the injury. The legal
basis for claims between responsible actors is uncertain and in international
law, more often than not, no court will be available in which coresponsible
parties can direct claims against each other.
The second option of proportionate liability raises different concerns,
chiefly related to attribution and causation. The essential problem with this
option is that in situations of concerted action it will not be easy, and often
may be outright impossible, to determine a causal contribution by individual
actors to the proscribed outcome. Indeed, if such a causal contribution could
be identified, there might not be a need to resort to joint responsibility at all;
a solution could be found in parallel application of individual responsibility
of the actors involved. There thus is need for an alternative basis for apportionment, such as fault or a predetermined apportionment derived from the
relevant applicable law and the nature of the collective endeavor. We leave
these matters for later consideration.

355.
One could of course contest this conceptually, arguing that without an actual "sanction" the deterrent purpose loses all of its potency, and practically, arguing that an injured
party might be unlikely to make a claim if no compensation is envisioned. That is certainly
true, but one should not underestimate the symbolic nature of international legal proceedings.
356.

See MAY, supra note 24, at 41-42.
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2. The Relationship Between the Responsible States
A separate set of questions concerns the relationship between the contributing states. This is where several liability may come into play. As
mentioned previously, several liability generally entails that an entity will
only be ultimately liable vis-A-vis other responsible entities for what is at7 In the event that it had to compensate fully for the damage,
tributable to it.3m
this principle gives the entity held responsible a claim against the others.
Obviously, therefore, the question of several liability only arises when one
adopts a system of "solidary" liability, as defined in the Principles of European Tort Law. 35 8 Like proportionate responsibility, several liability also
raises similar questions of causation and the decisive criteria for apportionment.
The question remains whether, outside specific regimes such as
UNCLOS, international law recognizes a principle of several liability that
allows for claims among responsible states. The issue has not been explored
and to our knowledge has not been raised in practice, but nonetheless a few
thoughts can be advanced.
In theory we could propose an approach where there is in fact no
apportionment between the contributing parties themselves. But this would
be hard to defend conceptually: why should a state that has not fully
contributed to the damage, but has nevertheless paid full compensation, be
prevented from claiming compensation from another state that has also
contributed to the injury?359 This would require some kind of "procedural
luck" concept according to which the first to be brought to court should bear
the brunt of reparations.
One could also argue that a single responsible state's payment of reparations in full to the injured party simultaneously ends the injured party's
claims and transfers the injured party's rights to the party that "overpaid" for
them, allowing it to raise claims against other, coresponsible states. This
mechanism would be similar to the situation in which a person A owes a
person B some money. Enter person C, who pays off the debt, resulting in
his substitution as B in relation to A. In this new (and autonomous) proceeding, it will be for the respondent state (who escaped responsibility in the first
action) to invoke the contributing act of the petitioning state in order to reduce the quantum of damages.
If we accept this analysis, the term "several" itself, if useful from a
descriptive point of view, becomes inadequate from a procedural point of
view. In effect, once a state has compensated the injured party fully, the
whole process starts over: the compensating state becomes the injured party
See supra Part V.A.
357.
PETL, supra note 109, art. 9:101 (defining "solidary liability").
358.
The PETL do mention an interesting scenario where, if one contributing party can359.
not be made to pay, its share is allocated to the other responsible parties in proportion to their
responsibility. PETL, supra note 109, art. 9:102(4). This is therefore one case where some
contributing parties may pay more than what they should.
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in relation to other states and may invoke their responsibility as would have
the injured state.
This construction raises fundamental questions, however, mostly in relation to the origin of the responsibility of the contributing state that has not
yet paid any reparations. This might logically be said to be the violation of
the initial primary obligation-but that obligation was initially only owed to
the victim state, and not to the coresponsible state or states. One could also
conceive of an autonomous duty to compensate the paying responsible state.
In any case, whatever the legal foundation of the duty to repair, the state's
proportion of contribution to the harm would still have to be demonstrated
as a matter of fact, once again emphasizing issues of causation and proportionality.
C. ProceduralAspects

In addition to the more substantive principles of shared responsibility
discussed above, we must also consider certain aspects of its procedure and
processes, in particular relating to procedures before international courts.
Although fundamental questions remain, principles of shared responsibility are bound to crystallize in the jurisprudence of international courts as
international law becomes increasingly judicialized. This trend calls for
greater analysis devoted to the multilateralization of dispute settlement.
1. The Judicialization of the International Legal Order
In addition to the four main trends identified previously, 360 one can also
identify a fifth trend that contextualizes questions of shared responsibility:
the increasing judicialization of international law. Judicialization certainly is
not limited to international law3 6' but has had a profound impact on it during
the last few years. We have seen an increase in the caseload of existing
tribunals and the establishment of new tribunals. The practice of the ICJ, the
dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization, investment
arbitration, the Seabed Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, and regional human rights courts illustrate this trend. 362
Furthermore, supervisory bodies established to control compliance with
360.

361.

See supra Part II.
See MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALI-

1 (2002) (noting that judicialization is found not only in the international law context,
but also at the regional level).
ZATION

362.
See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed
by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY APPLICATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 1 (Riidiger

Wolfrum & Deutsch Ulrike eds., 2009) (noting that the European Court of Human Rights is
faced with an increasing caseload); Freya Baetens, No Law Is an Island, Entire of Itself: How
International Investment Law Interacts with Other Fields of Public International Law, in
INVESTMENT

LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVES (Freya

Baetens ed., forthcoming 2013).
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treaty obligations (such as those in the fields of human rights, international
environmental law, and international labor law) have adopted decisions in an
increasing number of specific cases. National courts have also contributed to
363
this trend by increasingly adjudicating international law claims.
This trend has implications for our approach to shared responsibility. It
may be said that in the past there was no strong need for detailed rules of
shared responsibility simply because there were few cases in which such
rules were needed and because as long as claims are settled outside courts,
there is less need to resort to such technical rules. But as more claims involving multiple responsible parties reach the courts, there will be an
increasing need for more detailed and subtle rules governing the allocation
of responsibility among them. In the absence of such rules, fundamental
questions with normative implications will be left to the courts.
The trend toward judicialization is itself fuelled by several of the previously identified trends. This is particularly true of the increasing
heterogeneity of actors, as most judicial decisions are rendered in cases
where private parties have either individual rights-as in human rights and
investment law-or individual obligations-as in international criminal law.
Judicialization is also fueled by the increasing permeability of international
and national law as the number of national court adjudications of interna3
tional law claims vastly outnumbers judgments by international courts. 6
However, we also note that the trend toward judicialization raises fundamental questions about the authority and legitimacy of international
courts. These questions have been raised extensively in recent literature, notably in relation to the issue of the lack of democratic credentials of
3 66
international judicial bodies 365 and their extensive lawmaking powers. Because principles and processes of shared responsibility involve fundamental
normative questions pertaining to the allocation of responsibility, it should
be considered whether these decisions are properly entrusted to international
courts. 367

See Oxford Reports on InternationalLaw in Domestic Courts, OXFORD REPS. ON
L., http://www.oxfordlawreports.com/subscriber-articlesbycategory?module=ildc
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
This is evidenced by the rapidly growing number of national court decisions report364.
ed in Oxford Reports on International Law. See id. (listing 1070 domestic court adjudications
of international law claims).
See, e.g., Marlies Glasius, Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic
365.
Legitimacy?, 23 EUR. J.INT'L L. 43, 47 (2012) (citing various examples of scholars noting the
lack of democratic accountability in the international criminal tribunals and other courts).
See generally Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitima366.
tion of InternationalJudicial Lawmaking, in INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 473, 475
(Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke eds., 2012). For a discussion of judicial lawmaking in
the field of international criminal law, see Jacobs, supra note 52.
Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of Interna367.
tional Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 7, 25
(2012).
363.
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2. The Limits of Bilateral Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The principles of individual responsibility are accompanied by processes for implementation and enforcement that match the characteristics of
individual rather than shared responsibility.368 However, in the increasingly
complex character of international relations, "legal disputes between States
are rarely purely bilateral." 369 The present system of international dispute
settlement is hardly designed to deal with multilateral disputes.37 0 Procedures may not be able to capture all parties involved and may not do justice
to the complexity of a multilateral context.
Given that international dispute settlement mechanisms are based on the
consent of states, the mere fact that one state involved has not consented to
the judicial process may suffice to prevent any case against it for shared responsibility from undergoing judicial scrutiny. Likewise, where one of the
responsible actors is an international organization, most international judicial bodies will not be able to hear claims of shared responsibility against
them because acts by such organizations are typically not judiciable.
For instance, after the bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) by NATO began in 1999, the dispute was considered to exist in
different variations, including as a conflict between the FRY and the U.N.
Security Council, NATO, and NATO member states. Due to the aforementioned limitations on judiciability of organizational acts, a legal claim was
brought by the FRY against only the member states of NATO. A dispute in
legal terms only arose after individualization of disputes between FRY and
each of the states.3 7'
The bilateral nature of dispute settlement proceedings is particularly
unsatisfactory for two reasons. On the one hand, if a complex dispute is recharacterized as a bilateral dispute because of procedural requirements of
judicial institutions, it may inevitably have consequences for the states
excluded from the dispute settlement process. Reisman noted that "[a]s
interaction increases, more bilateral disputes will have peripheral effects."3 72
368.
For a discussion of the connection between substance and procedure, see Markus
Benzing, Community Interests in the Procedure of InternationalCourts and Tribunals, 5 LAW
& PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 369, 407 (2006); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance
in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1013, 1013 (2008).
369.
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austi.), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240, 298 (June 26) (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
370.
Lori Fisler Damrosch, MultilateralDisputes, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 379, 379 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987).
371.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia instituted proceedings before the ICJ against
ten NATO member states, each of which had recognized the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Provisional Measures, Order, 1999
I.C.J. 761 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. U.K.), Provisional
Measures, Order, 1999 I.C.J. 826 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, Order, 1999 I.C.J. 916 (June 2).
372.
WILLIAM MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDs 332 (1971).
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For example, a possible determination of the liability of the first state might
entail the effective determination of the liability of others in fact involved in
the dispute, if not the dispute settlement. 373
On the other hand, the absence of potentially coresponsible parties from
a dispute settlement proceeding may adversely affect the interests of the respondent state "both by its inability to obtain needed evidence and by the
differential levels of obligation that could be created when some but not all
of the involved states are bound by the Court's judgment." 37 4
Developing the international legal regime in a direction where it can
better deal with questions of shared responsibility therefore does not only
require adjustment of principles but also of processes of responsibility and
adjudication.
3. Dealing with the Limits of Bilateral Mechanisms
In considering how dispute settlement can better take into account the
context of collective action, we distinguish between the two categories of
situations as previously described: how to promote multiparty proceedings
and how to deal with the absence of some contributing entities from the proceedings.
First of all, what procedures should be put in place to facilitate the most
comprehensive participation in the proceedings of all relevant parties? The
answer depends on who has the obligation to ensure that this happens. From
the point of view of an international court, this may involve consideration
of joinder procedures, which grant courts the power to add parties to a
procedure, and powers to order production of evidence in the hands of
third parties. On this point, substantial differences exist between the practices of different international courts; for example, in the ECtHR joinder is
more common than in the ICJ.Y5 In principle, these differences can be
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections,
373.
Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 240, 329 (June 26) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel); Monetary
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v.Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Preliminary Question, Judgment,
1954 I.C.J. 19, 31-33 (June 15).
Damrosch, supra note 370, at 391.
374.
Both the European Court of Human Rights and the ICJ court rules permit joinder.
375.
See Eur. Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, r. 42(1), (2) (Sept. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/6ACIA02E-9A3C-4EO6-94EF-EOBD37773 IDA/O/
REGLEMENTEN_2012.pdf; Int'l Court of Justice, Rules of Court, art. 47 (July 1978),
3
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl-4&p2=3&p --O. However, as a
practical matter, the ICJ is less likely to order joinder. See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. &
Montenegro v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 1307, 1441-42 (separate
opinion of Judge Kreda) (explaining the limited nature of joinder in the ICJ); Sovereignty over
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon.IMalay.), Application for Permission to Intervene,
Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 575 (Oct. 23) (rejecting joinder request); Peter H.F. Bekker, Intemational Decision, Questions of Interpretationand Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom)
and (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyav. United States), 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 503, 508 (1998) ("[The]
ICJ has ordered a formal joinder of the proceedings in two cases only."); Hugh Thirlway, The
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well explained by (and indeed support our distinction between) the public
and private law dimensions of international courts. This is particularly true
of the ICJ, where there is a fundamental tension between the Court's consensual structure and the public law nature of the claims it may be asked to
adjudicate.
In relation to this point, although issues of shared responsibility primarily focus on situations of multiple responsible entities rather than
multiple claimants, it should be acknowledged that the latter situation can be
affected by the existence of the former. For example, the drafting of ASR
Article 46, which relates to multiple claimants,37 6 is evidently premised on
the idea of independent attribution of responsibility that underlies the ILC
framework. Indeed, it mentions "the state" that has committed the wrongful
act, rather than "the states." Interestingly, although not unsurprisingly given
the general philosophy of the Articles, this point is not discussed in the
commentary, which only says that Article 46 enshrines "the principle that
where there are several injured States, each of them may separately invoke
the responsibility for the internationally wrongful act on its own account."3 77
It is therefore likely that rules of shared responsibility will impact the operation of Article 46, most notably on the question whether all injured states
can raise a claim against all contributing states and on the question of the
nature and quantum of the reparations that can be claimed against one or
more states by one or more injured states.
The second issue to consider is how courts should deal with the absence
of a party to the proceedings. Indeed, for a number of reasons, not all responsible entities might be present. This could be due to the fact that a state
has not consented to the relevant court's exercise of jurisdiction (notably in
the ICJ) or simply because the plaintiff has directed the claim against only
one or a few responsible parties. Moreover, the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over a number of entities that might have contributed to injury, such as
international organizations, individuals, or other nonstate actors.
The starting point for discussion in relation to this latter problem is the
Monetary Gold principle. This principle, which has its origin in the 1954
ICJ judgment,378 provides that
where the legal interests of a third State, which itself is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the respective tribunal, forms the very subjectmatter of the dispute, the case cannot be heard and decided. Such
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-89: Part Ten, 2000 BRIT. Y.B.

L. 1, 164 (discussing identical cases before the ICJ that were not joined and resulted in
separate judgments).
376.
ASR, supra note 17, 76, art. 46 ("Where several States are injured by the same
internationally wrongful act, each injured State may separately invoke the responsibility of the
State which has committed the internationally wrongful act.").
377.
ASR, supra note 17, 77, art. 46, cmt. 1.
378.
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K. & U.S.), Preliminary
Question, Judgment, 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June 15).
INT'L
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third State is considered a 'necessary third party' to the case, 7the interests of which form the very core of the underlying dispute.
The main issue relating to this principle and how it affects situations of
shared responsibility relates to its scope. The original judgment of the ICJ in
1954 was relatively narrow and case specific. It was narrow in the sense that
it found that it could not consider what constituted a legal dispute between
Italy and Albania without the consent of Albania. In the Court's words, "To
adjudicate upon the international responsibility of Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-established principle in international law
embodied in the Court's Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise ju38 0
risdiction over a State with its consent." It was case specific in the sense
that the ICJ was called upon to decide on the very material allocation of
gold to Italy, the United Kingdom, or Albania. In light of this, at least some
of the subsequent extensions of the principle 81 can be subjected to critique,
not only because of the barriers they impose for a workable system of
shared responsibility, but also based on the consistency of the case law of
the Court itself.
One of these possible extensions is whether the principle applies
beyond states to international organizations. In his dissenting opinion in the
Lockerbie case, Judge Schwebel argued that it does, choosing to apply
Monetary Gold to find that the ICJ lacked the ability to consider the legality
382
of a Security Council resolution in light of its absence in the proceedings.
More recently, the Court implicitly recognized that the Monetary Gold
principle could extend to organizations by rejecting its application to NATO
83
on factual grounds, rather than ab initio. Given the fact that a number of
collective endeavors are now the result of collaborations between states and
international organizations, or actions of states within the framework of
international organizations, such an extension would have notable
consequences on the capacity of the ICJ to adjudicate in situations of shared
Andreas Zimmerman, InternationalCourts and Tribunals, Intervention in Proceed379.
INT'L L., http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber-article?
ings, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB.
16 90 37
-e (last updated Aug. 2006).
id=/epillentries/law-978019923
Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 32.
380.
This is most notable in the East Timor case, where the ICJ declined to consider the
381.
responsibility of Australia based on the fact that this would involve discussing the legality of
Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in the absence of Indonesia as a party to the proceedings. See East Timor (Port. v.Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 34 (June 30).
See Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Aris382.
ing from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998
I.C.J. 115, 172 (Feb. 27) (dissenting opinion of President Schwebel) ("For the Court to adjudge the legality of the Council's decisions in a proceeding brought by one State against
another would be for the Court to adjudicate the Council's rights without giving the Council a
hearing.").
Application of Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Former Yugoslav Republic of
383.
41-44 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.icj-cij.org/
Maced. v. Greece), Judgment,
docket/files/142/16827.pdf.
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responsibility. One way to counter this broad interpretation of the principle
is to return to its roots, namely the way it was framed in the Monetary Gold
judgment. One can thus argue that a logical consequence of the Court's
consent-based reasoning is that the principle only applies to entities that
could in fact consent to the Court's jurisdiction, which would exclude
international organizations and other nonstate entitites. In addition, this
would coincide with the fact that, in the absence of any possible jurisdiction
over an entity, the ICJ cannot be said to ever be able to adjudicate (in a
technical sense) on the rights of that entity. Finally, should the principle be
applied to international organizations, entities over which the ICJ does not
have jurisdiction, what conceptual barrier would exist to applying it to other
entities over which the Court does not have jurisdiction, such as individuals
or various nonstate actors? The consequence of a broad reading of the
principle would be to seriously impair the role of the ICJ given that most
attribution operations involve, at some level or another, discussion of the
acts (and the legality thereof) of individuals or organs acting as de jure or de
facto organs of the state.
CONCLUSION
As illustrated by this Article, changes in modern international relations
and the international legal order bring to the fore the necessity of a comprehensive discussion of issues of shared responsibility. The interdependence of
a variety of actors increases the likelihood of concerted action (and harm
occurring from it) and requires that new rules be conceived to address this
new reality. Moreover, the growing recognition of the public-order dimensions of international society implies that the traditional construction of
international responsibility needs to be revisited.
Discussions on shared responsibility cannot remain purely technical
without being embedded in a broader conceptual discussion of international
responsibility in general. The current framework is the historical fruit of a
primitive and horizontal conception of the international legal order. However, the current framework does not fully correspond any longer with the
reality of today's international legal order, which has reached a new level of
maturity. And maturity is necessarily accompanied by complexity, complexity of the legal relationships among actors and complexity of the
interests promoted and protected by the law. The law of responsibility must
acknowledge this complexity.
This is why, as a conceptual foundation of shared responsibility, we
propose an approach to international responsibility that is based on greater
differentiation than the traditional unitary model and that better reflects the
diversity of interests protected. More specifically, we call for a more systematic reading of the objectives of international responsibility in light of
the public-private dichotomy. While this dichotomy is not watertight and
should be considered as a continuum with shades of grey, we believe that it
provides for a more relevant framework of analysis for thinking about inter-
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national (and shared) responsibility. Using the same logic, we also call for
moving beyond the primary-secondary dichotomy so as to better explain the
relationship between obligations and the attribution of responsibility. This
framework provides us with a starting point to discuss issues of shared responsibility in a more subtle and comprehensive way.
In this context, we have suggested a number of avenues that may be explored, both with respect to the content of the law of responsibility and its
practical application. In relation to the substantive rules of responsibility, a
key proposal is the possible adoption of joint and several responsibility in
international responsibility, the scope and content of which would depend
not only on the "simple" operation of individual attribution, but on a number
of other considerations. For one, the relationship of the responsible entities
needs to be considered. As was explained, consent to cooperative actions
may justify that responsibility flow from consent rather than actual conduct.
Second, the nature of the particular obligations, such as those relating to international crimes, might justify in themselves that responsibility be shared
by a group of states or even the international community as a whole. Finally,
the nature of the responsibility (along the public-private distinction) might
justify different rules, such as the apportionment of reparation obligations
among a number of responsible entities.
In relation to the application of the law of responsibility, we have suggested the need to reconsider the fundamentally bilateral dynamic of
international dispute settlement, which does not allow for the adequate addressing of situations of shared responsibility. This requires that procedural
rules be devised to address the absence of possible coresponsible entities,
both by allowing them to be joined to the proceedings and for preventing
proceedings from being terminated as a result of their continued absence, as
illustrated by a more restrictive reading of the Monetary Gold principle.
We recognize that our proposed approach may meet fundamental obstacles in terms of its reception by states. The current state of the law, which
may favor "buck passing" and may make it difficult to implement principles
of shared responsibility, may work to the benefit of states by giving them a
better chance of avoiding responsibility. This being so, it is not likely that
they will easily embrace change.
Moreover, any change in the existing system will need to take into account the fundamental interests of foreseeability and predictability. In
particular, when a seemingly uniform system is replaced by a more contextual and differentiated approach, it should be considered whether it is
desirable that breaches of one type of obligation trigger different responsibility rules than breaches of another treaty that might be dealing with similar

types of obligations.3 8 4
In this respect there is a close relationship between the principles applying to
384.
(shared) responsibility and the rule of law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 151, at 79. For a discussion of the role of legality and foreseeability as rule-of-law criteria, see Arthur Watts, The
InternationalRule of Law, 36 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 15, 26-28 (1993).

438

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 34:359

However, the primary ambition of the intellectual project that underlies
this Article is to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive discussion of
shared responsibility, based on an examination, critique, and development of
relevant practices. This will require uniting fragmented discussions from
different fields of law and other disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy,
and political theory. In this sense, to advance this ambitious project, this
Article serves as a meeting point and a stepping stone for the bringing
together of various communities of international law, including academics
and practitioners from across doctrinal fields such as human rights, military
operations, refugee law, and environmental law as well as other communities
from the social sciences without which a conceptual discussion of the issues
would remain impossible. Only through this intellectual cross-fertilization
will the dynamics of shared responsibility be adequately explained,
understood, and ultimately implemented in the ever-evolving international
society.

